Shared beliefs, group interests, and the coordination of advocacy coalitions

by:  Michael A. Fotos, III

The Nature Conservancy and Trinity College

 

            Few observers doubt that material self-interest motivates the lobbying activity of producer groups (Schattschneider 1960; Olson 1965, 1971; Stigler 1971; Walker 1991; Heinz et al. 1993).  Nevertheless, all policy, even that which enriches a select few, must pass some (however spurious) test of public benefit.  “Engine Charlie” Wilson, the discoverer of the unity of GM’s and the nation’s interest, is only one of the countless corporate chieftains who claim a heretofore unrecognized alignment of public and private interest (Schattschneider 1960 27).

            Citizens groups are different.  Their claims to represent the public interest enjoy the presumption of credibility.  The consistency of their message speaks to a certain sincerity of purpose (Jenkins-Smith, St.Clair, and Wood 1991).  Case closed, explanation complete, so it seems.

            My study of environmental policy implementation reveals otherwise.  Environmental groups and their pro-industry counterparts are equally sophisticated in their responses to policy outputs (Fotos 2000).  Why then wouldn’t they be equally sophisticated in other ways?  I believe they are.  The “more structured belief system” attributed to public interest coalitions (Jenkins-Smith, St.Clair, and Wood 1991) reflects the strategic response of citizens group organizers to their particular collective action problem.

            Advocacy coalitions are “are composed of  people from a variety of public and private organizations who shared a set of fundamental beliefs or interests” (Sabatier and Pelkey 1987, 248).  Coalitions and their constituent groups face a number of overlapping collective action problems that are potentially more solvable if coalition members share certain beliefs (Schlager and Blomquist undated).  One may further compress the beliefs and interests of groups into a single theoretical argument that treats expressions of belief as functionally dependent on the interests of group patrons.  Moreover, this theoretical reduction explains coordination (or the lack thereof) among advocacy coalition actors.

            The organization of groups requires patrons, i.e. large donors who are attracted by a particular mix of benefits that association with a larger group can provide (King and Walker 1991).  Donor motivation is almost as diverse as the financially-capable public at large (cf. Lowry 1999; Moe 1980; Truman 1951, 1971).  When both the policy effects and the attentive public are widely dispersed and highly diverse, group organizers must pick an audience with a sustainable interest in the issues the organizers hope to influence.  Thus, issue specialization (Bosso 1995) and consistency in belief structure (Jenkins-Smith, St.Clair, and Wood 1991) are evidence of the strategic imperative to divide the concerned public into policy-relevant segments.

            The analogous corporate practice is “branding.”  Communication with potential and actual group supporters is difficult and costly.  A consistently advertised set of beliefs eventually imbues the group name with a brand-like identity that efficiently conveys the value patrons can expect.  Among conservation donors, The Nature Conservancy has a reputation for protecting plants and animals through its focus on the acquisition of land.[1]  The Sierra Club embodies John Muir’s passion to protect the wild lands that helped define our nation’s character (Stegner (ed.) 1998).  Indeed, many environmental group names are issue and policy advertisements themselves; Ducks Unlimited, The Wilderness Society, League of Conservation Voters, Earth First!, and so on.

            These groups do not change beliefs to suit donors.  Indeed, if they did they would drive donors away.  Rather, group beliefs and the group’s reputation for action consistent with those beliefs reveal the utility of the group brand to the donor’s own interests.  The expressed beliefs of public interest groups probably reflect the sincere expressions of group founders.  Yet, as time passes and new group leaders come and go, fidelity to the original beliefs remains relatively strong because to act otherwise weakens the brand.  If the original beliefs retain a strong appeal, then advertising them strengthens the brand and creates opportunities for group organizers to exercise more influence over policy. 

            When used to explain the coordination of groups in an advocacy coalition, the principle of fidelity to group beliefs implies that coalition coordination is a byproduct of the strategic interaction among groups with overlapping or complementary interests.  Any policy is likely to have a disproportionate effect on a small number of groups.  Groups emerge as coalition leaders in the policy areas of most concern to their patrons.  Groups demonstrate the “value of the brand” by their influence on issues their supporters care about.  Efficacy may require assembling a coalition.  It may not.  The level of coalition coordination is a function of interest concentration and the organizational capacity of the group or groups most affected by the policy.  Olson’s (1965, 1971) characterization of the collective action of privileged groups as the exploitation of the great by the small is particularly apt.

            The strategic calculus of coalition joiners illustrates the centrality of this point.  For a group with slight interest in a particular policy area, the key to involvement is the prospective viability of coalition efforts.  If nothing is likely to happen, there is little incentive to expend group resources on a matter of tangential importance.  In contrast, a group whose patrons are substantively affected by a particular policy may have no choice but to become involved regardless of the likely outcome.  On the other hand, when it looks like a bill is headed for passage or a regulation is slated for approval groups with a peripheral interest will join the rush to claim credit or to add a favorable amendment.

            When one narrows the field of analysis to policy implementation, coalition coordination depends on the well-endowed few.  Laws take effect when individual agents apply them to specific cases.  Any given law may affect many people.  However, each application of the law occurs separately and affects relatively few people.  As a consequence, the universe of interested actors shrinks dramatically and so do the opportunities for coordinated action.   State implementation of the federal surface mining law generates a hierarchical pattern of coalition coordination.[2]  A large national group (usually the National Wildlife Federation) retains a lawyer who recruits a local, grass roots group (or groups) to add to the complaint, petition, etc.  The local group recruits a few local citizens to add their names (and their local addresses, accents, and grants of legal standing).  Coordination is vertical, serially dyadic, and dependent on the patronage of the national intervenor.  Horizontal coordination among equally situated groups does occur, most frequently in the form of informational exchanges.  Horizontal coordination for the purpose of applying a specific guidance instrument to a specific policy output appears to be relatively rare among citizens groups in this policy subsystem.

            To sum up, the advocacy coalition one observes in the real world may constitute a carefully constructed alliance of committed partisans; it may be a spontaneous parade of interested actors trying to hitch a ride on a winning horse; it may reflect the complementary actions of many “lone eagles” each forced to fight by singular strategic circumstances; or an advocacy coalition may contain elements of all three.  As the logic of collective action (Olson 1965, 1971) implies, coalition members will contribute to coalition formation and maintenance only to the extent that the individually appropriable gains from doing so exceed the costs.  Thus, coalition coordination depends on the population of interested actors, the various ways they solve their own separate collective action problems, and the distribution of policy costs and benefits among financially and organizationally capable coalition members.

            Little has changed since James Madison wrote The Federalist X.  Coalitions pull together (or fall apart) because of their common (or divergent) interest in what government can provide (Pelzman 1976; Anton 1989).  The reciprocal effects of reason and self-love are enduring reasons to view with suspicion any actor’s claim of devotion to the public interest (Bailyn (ed.) 1993, Part One, 405) or more pointedly, interest begets belief.  Thus, the expressed beliefs of any particular group and its actions to advance those beliefs may simply reflect a narrowly rational calculation of the group’s “self” interest.

 

References

Anton, Thomas. 1989. American Federalism and Public Policy: How the System Works. New York: Random House.

 

Bailyn, Bernard. 1993. The Debate on the Constitution (Part One and Part Two). New York: The Literary Classics of America (The Library of America).

 

Bosso, Christopher J. 1995. "The Color of Money: Environmental Groups and the Pathologies of Fundraising," in Interest Group Politics. Fourth Edition, Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis (eds.) Washington: CQ Press. pp. 101-130.

 

Fotos, III, Michael A. 2000. Organized Interests and the Implementation of Environmental Policy. unpublished dissertation, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University.

 

Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson and Robert H. Salisbury. 1993. The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

 

Jenkins-Smith, Hank, Gilbert St.Clair, and Brian Woods. 1991. “Explaining Change in Policy Subsystems: Analysis of Coalition Stability and Defection Over Time,” American Journal of Political Science. 35:851-80.

 

King, David C. and Jack L. Walker, Jr. 1991. “The Origins and Maintenance of Groups,” in Walker, Jack L. (1991) Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions and Social Movements. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

Lowry, Robert C. 1999. "Foundation Patronage Toward Citizen Groups and Think Tanks: Who Gets Grants?" The Journal of Politics. 61:758-76.

 

Moe, Terry M. 1980. "A Calculus of Group Membership," American Journal of Political Science. 24:593-632.

 

Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

 

Pelzman, Sam. 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation." Journal of Law and Economics. 19:211-40.

 

Sabatier, Paul. 1986. "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research:  A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis," Journal of Public Policy. 6:21-48.

 

Sabatier, Paul and Neil Pelkey. 1987. "Incorporating Multiple Actors and Guidance Instruments into Models of Regulatory Policymaking: An Advocacy Coalition Approach," Administration and Society. 19: 236-63.

 

Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

 

Schlager, Edella and William Blomquist. (undated). "Emerging Political Theories of the Policy Process: Institutional Rational Choice, the Politics of Structural Choice, and Advocacy Coalitions."  University of Arizona and Indiana University.

 

Walker, Jack L. (1991) Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions and Social Movements. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

 

manuscript submitted: July 6, 2000, revised October 24, 2000