PUBLIC POLICY THEORY: WILL IT PLAY IN PEORIA?

 

Peter deLeon

Katie Kaufmanis

 

Introduction

The development of most all scientific endeavors seems to run a standardized pattern, starting with an informal accounting of various phenomena under somewhat specific conditions, later morphing to careful record keeping in search of, ultimately, a full-blown set of empirical observations and theorems and maybe even “laws,” all culminating in a set of predictions (at specified levels of confidence), under the general condition, “if X, then Y.”  This progression seems as inculcated in Western civilization as life itself, at least since the Age of the Enlightenment. 

It follows, then, that when one “science” (which the Random House Dictionary [p. 1099] defines as “the observation, identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretic explanation of natural phenomenon”) displaces another (e.g., Einsteinian relativity superceded  Newtonian physics), the now-outmoded set of scientific tenets is relegated to the (proverbial) dustbin of science; as an example, did any post-Galileo astronomers refer back to the Ptolemic solar system in terms of orbital mechanics?  We propose that one of the principal features of the policy sciences – i.e., the policy process, delineating a number of (usually) sequential stages or phases – has relatively recently been relegated to much the same Ptolemic fate as a new “host” of  “theories of the policy process” have emerged.  These have been most carefully and succinctly (although surely not exhaustive) detailed in Paul A. Sabatier’s Theories of the Policy Process (1999).  Although P. deLeon contributed a chapter to this volume (entitled “The Stages Approach to the Policy Process”), one gets the distinct impression that its place in the book was more as a  relic, a benchmark on where the study of the policy process has been (for better or for worse, but generally the latter, in a Don Quixotean sense; see Sabatier, 1999, p. 278) and, implicitly, an avowal to leave that level of analysis behind.

We propose that in this particular instance, many of the more contemporary theorists of the policy process have possibly overstepped their intentions in proposing new and supposed  more insightful theories, and, thus, are in possible danger of throwing out the baby with the bath water.  Another way of phrasing this observation is that the stages approach to the policy process still has much vitality and insight to offer in terms of analytic and political promise.  Without wishing to perpetuate a manner of viewing the policy world (no policy institutions or perceptions are timeless, as Herbert Kaufman [1991] has so cogently observed), let us offer a series of explanations why there is still plenty of life left in this particular (and, even its critics admit, very well-ridden) horse that might very well continue to share and carry the study of public policy in important ways. 

This essay offers a very brief review of the policy process itself, a more careful discussion of its putative shortcomings, and an argument for its continuation.  The explicit purpose of the essay  addresses the current state of public policy theory and asks are the critics of the policy process approach proposing something of such transcendent value such that these theories should totally replace the policy process framework in terms of its proven and tangible contributions to the understanding of public policy.  That is, will the criticisms of the policy process “play in Peoria”?

 

The Policy Process

The study of policy (either in review or in planning new policy initiatives) is probably as ancient as the study of humankind; certainly a good case can be made that the Bible (especially the Old Testament) is at least partially an exercise in policy analysis (with, of course, one very  major exogenous actor); Barbara Tuchman’s The March of Folly  (1984) uses the Trojan War and the American War for Independence as illustrations of policy activities from which she gleans   contemporary lessons.  But these were mostly isolated incidents; the systematic study of public policy (with rare exceptions; see, possibly, Machiavelli’s The Prince) with the intention of applying its lessons to new public policy – that is, to become instrumental in policy change and learning – is a distinctly 20^th century and largely American phenomenon.  Many scholars of policy history (e.g., deLeon, 1983) have identified Harold D. Lasswell and his colleagues (such as Daniel Lerner, Myres McDougal, and Abraham Kaplan) as the progenitors of the policy sciences in the early 1950s, a movement that seemingly “took hold” by the 1970s with the founding of several public policy schools (and their attendant curricula).  While others have slightly different versions (Radin, 2000), the general outlines remain generally above dispute.

Lasswell (1971, p. 28) suggested  a “conceptual map [that] must provide a guide to obtaining a generalistic image of the major stages of any collective act,” one Lasswell (1956)  articulated as the “decision process”:

- Intelligence

- Promotion

- Prescription

- Invocation

- Application

- Termination

- Appraisal.

These “stages” became the seedling for what was later known as “the policy process” approach (see, for instances, Charles Jones’ An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy [1970, 1977, 1984 editions], James Anderson’s Public Policy Making, and Garry Brewer and Peter deLeon’s The Foundations of Policy Analysis [1983]), generally characterized by a series of policy “stages”derived from the Lasswellian list.   The following components for the policy stages (or phases) as proposed by Brewer and deLeon (1983) are representative:

- Policy Initiation: the recognition of a problem and the preparation of policy recommendations.

- Policy Estimation: an analysis of the likelihood that any of the policy proposals will prove to be a success or a failure.

- Selection: a stage at which an authoritative policymaker will choose among the policy alternatives.

- Policy Implementation: that stage in which the selected policy option will be carried out.

- Policy Evaluation: that stage in which the policy option chosen during Selection and Implementation is assessed in terms of (at a minimum) efficiency and results.

- Policy Termination: that stage during which a poorly performing (or unnecessary) option is discontinued.

In one way or another, occasionally using slightly different terminologies, numerous authors have adopted this basic version of the “policy process” framework as a means of suggesting to their students and clients that different stages of the policy process have different requirements and skill sets.  For instance, policy estimators engaged in cost-benefit analyses could operate in relative isolation, where policy implementors would (almost by necessity) be forced to engage the actual  recipients of the intended policy.

It is important to recognize that Lasswell and his successors did not refer to the policy process as if it were a formal “model” or “theory”of the policy process, one conducive to the generation of specific “testable” hypotheses; rather, he spoke of the policy process as an “approach.”  Speaking at least for the deLeon half of the Brewer and deLeon (1983) volume, we even denied that we were presenting a “rational” depiction, if by “rational” we were suggesting an economic framework of the decision process.  What we did claim to be presenting was a framework that could be used to collect and interpret various congeries of data and then structure them in such ways that useful information could be presented to authoritative policymakers.  This usage coincides closely with Edella Schlager’s (1999, p. 234)  definition of a “framework”:

Frameworks bound inquiry and direct the attention of the analyst to critical features of the social and physical landscape.  Frameworks provide a foundation for inquiry by specifying classes of variables loosely fit together into a coherent structure.  Thus, frameworks organize inquiry, but they cannot...provide explanations for, or prediction of, behavior and outcomes.

 

Critiques of the Policy Process

Although most will agree that the policy process concept has been instrumental in developing the field of policy studies (cf. Sabatier, 1999, pp. 6, and deLeon, 1999, p. 22), by the late 1980s, scholars were beginning to question the suggestion that it represented a “model”.  Sabatier has been the most articulate critic, indicating that it was, by his definition, certainly not a “model,” or even a “framework;” better, he suggested, to call it an “heuristic.”  In his recent (1999, p. 7; also see Sabatier, 1993, p. ) assessments, Sabatier indicated that in terms of the “scientific model,” the “stages heuristic” was not really a causal theory, was descriptively inaccurate, was inordinately “top down,” and was, at base, simplistic.^[1]  But one needs to be careful in accepting the composite of Sabatier’s very thoughtful and, if valid, certainly withering criticism.

Most centrally, one can fairly ask if the critics of the policy process framework are attacking the policy process approach as it was posed, rather then what they conceive it to be.  That is, Lasswell (and, subsequently, Brewer and deLeon. 1983)) never framed the policy process as a “model,” rather an approach, a means of viewing and categorizing an individual’s observations.  Yet Sabatier (1999) clearly subscribes to a “model mind set”: if it ain’t a model, it ain’t a starter, or, to be more charitable, if it is not at least a framework on the way to a model (as he describes the Advocacy Coalition Framework [ACF], which he and Jenkins-Smith have advanced), it is a non-starter.  Hence, his “devastating criticisms” (Sabatatier, 1999, p. 7) of the policy process approach are justifiable only if one concedes that he is criticizing a target that he, as opposed to its proponents, has created.

At critical issue here is what are the critics of the policy process are attempting to do.  Again, using Sabatier as a spokesperson, it is difficult to attend to his description of an investigation of the world’s policy phenomenon as bipolar in nature: either an overtly ad hoc fashion or a world dominated by science (with all its insights and baggage) and its penchant for prediction.  Ronald Brunner proposes an alternative goal for a policy process approach in the context of the policy sciences: “The purpose of the policy sciences as ‘science’ is to realize more of the potential for free choice through the sharing of insight.  The purpose is not prediction” (Brunner, 1991, p. 70; emphasis in original). As deLeon has posed elsewhere (deLeon, 1998), would a theorist wish to subvert practical insight for the possibility of a theoretic coruscation, which would probably only apply under a very exacting (and often unlikely) set of circumstances and  post hoc reflection?  Perhaps, but it would seem that the study of policy would –  indeed should – permit both approaches with equal appreciation.  To force a dichotomy onto the policy process community would perform a genuine disservice.

This is not a plea for a theory-free study of the policy world.  As many (e.g., Stone, 1997; Danziger, 1995) have observed, it is virtually impossible to be a-theoretic regarding public policy, despite the protestations of empiricists everywhere.  What is characteristically difficult to do is to recognize and then articulate these theories, underlying or otherwise.  What is more difficult, however, is to keep them in perspective, and not try to explain everything in terms of an ACF or a “punctuated equilibrium” or “institutional rational choice” or whatever.  As Albert Hirschman (1970) cautioned years ago, one does not want to adhere too strictly to a paradigm in fear of it becoming more a blinder than a lantern.

While we are happy to admit that a policy process framework surely has its shortcomings, I would also propose that it has its advantages, only the least of which is that it permits the policy scholar to identify and place a number of otherwise disparate policy research issues, such as evaluation or implementation (or their conjunction or distinctions) with some clarity.  A second advantage is that it encourages the introduction of emerging and innovative perspectives and methodologies to the policy research community.  Without casting any aspersions on the authors Sabatier has chosen to include in his Theories of the Policy Process volume, it is difficult, given his criteria for selection,  to include any of the post-positivist policy approaches into their conceptual or methodological structures.  This is not to say that post-positivists (such as John Dryzek [1990]) must be included, but their exclusion certainly lends itself to an unnecessary bifurcation of the field of inquiry.  Even taken as an idea, should we agree with Sabatier (1999, p. 6) who has written, “Ideally [a theory] is mathematical”?   We, joined by a host of political theorists (from Plato to John Stuart Mill to Foucault to the Frankfurt School and beyond), would argue not.  

Finally, C.E. Lindblom and others have long argued that “lay probing” and “muddling through” and “usable knowledge” have their places in the policy sun (Lindblom, 1990; Lindblom and Cohen, 1976; also Wildavsky, 1988).  The exclusion of lay knowledge by some contemporary policy theorists would be truly unfortunate.  These activities are as acceptable in a policy process framework as they are excluded from most of the proposed policy theories.  Can we afford to set them rather  brusquely aside?  Again, we suggest not.

Conclusion

In short, it seems that policy research scholars already have enough endemic disputes to wage a protracted civil war.  While we can agree that policy “inquiry” (to use Lindblom’s phrase) must be of a practical nature (i.e., be “usable” in regards to the body politic), one wonders if the broad purposes of public policy analysis are well served by being split into “argumentative” camps over the respective roles and applications of heuristics, frameworks, theories, models, and (yes, even) paradigms, whose very definitions themselves are grounds for many a Guiness.  To abandon the policy process framework to the wayward home for abandoned paradigms without realizing its continued utilities would be myopic.  Similarly, to suggest that it has heroic (even theoretic) qualities, that is, to treat it as “truth” incarnate, would be equally shortsighted. 

Rather than ascribing either mythic or quotidian qualities to the policy process framework, let us recognize and accept what it does best – to reiterate, to acknowledge that there are different phases in a program’s life that require different skills, and to use them discerningly .  The policy process framework allows for a diversity of views, points of reference, and ideas, in a wide set of political circumstances (i.e., levels and even forms of government).  This is not, then, a tract against the continued development of public policy theory; to be honest, these theorists have much to offer on their own turf and, even it we thought they did not, who are we to rail against the waves of scientific progress?  What this decidedly is, however, is an explicit rejection of the Sabatier’s (1999, p. 7) assertion that “The stages heuristic has outlived its usefulness ....” The study of public policy should not be restricted to an exclusive playground for academic theorists; if it is not allowed to “play in Peoria” – if citizens are not permitted to understand and even assume a role in what is happening – then one needs to wonder seriously as to what we are doing, why, and for whom.

 

Peter deLeon is a Professor of Public Policy at the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the University of Colorado (Denver).  Ms. Katie Kaufmanis is a doctoral candidate at the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the University of Colorado (Denver). 

REFERENCES

 

Anderson, James E.  1975/1979.  Public Policy Making.  New York: Holt, Reinhart, & Winston.

 

Brewer, Garry D., and Peter deLeon. 1983.  The Foundations of Policy Analysis.  Monterey, CA:  Brooks/Cole.

 

Brunner, Ronald D.  1991.  “The Policy Movement as a Policy Problem.”  Policy Sciences.  Vol. 24, No. 1 (February).  Pp. 65-98.

 

Danziger, Marie.  1995.  “Policy Analysis Postmodernized.”  Policy Studies Journal.  Vol. 25, No. 3 (Fall).  Pp. 435-450.

 

deLeon, Peter.  1988.  Advice and Consent.  New York: The Russell Sage Foundation.

 

------.  1998.  “Models of Policy Discourse: Insights vs. Prediction.”  Policy Studies Journal.  Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring).  Pp. 147-161.

 

------.  1999.  “The Stages Approach to the Policy Process, in Paul A.. Sabatier (ed.).  1999.  Theories of the Policy Process.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Chap. 2.

 

Dryzek, John S.  1990.  Discursive Democracy.  New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

Hirschman, Albert O.  1970. “The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding.”  World Politics.  Vol. 22, No. 3 (April).  Pp. 329-343.

 

Jones, Charles.  1970/1974/1984.  An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy.  Belmont, CA:  Wadsworth.

 

Kaufman, Herbert A.  1991.  Time, Chance, and Organization.  Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.  Second Edition.

 

Lasswell, Harold D. 1956.  The Decision Process.  College Park: University of Maryland Press.

 

------.  1971.  A Pre-View of Policy Sciences.  New York: American Elsevier.

 

Lindblom, Charles E.  1990.  Inquiry and Change.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

 

------, and David K. Cohen.  1979.  Usable Knowledge.  New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

 

Radin, Beryl A.  2000.  Beyond Machiavelli: Policy Analysis Comes of Age.  Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

Sabatier, Paul A.. (ed.).  1999.  Theories of the Policy Process.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

 

------, and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.).  1993.  “The Study of the Public Policy Process.”  In Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.).  1993.  Policy Change and Learning.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

 

Schlager, Edella.  1999.  “A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories, and Models of Policy Processes.”  In Paul A..Sabatier  (ed.).  1999.  Theories of the Policy Process.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Chap. 9.

 

Stone, Deborah A.  1997.  Policy Paradox.  New York: Norton.

 

Tuchman, Barbara.  1984.  The March of Folly.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

 

Wildavsky, Aaron.  1988.  The New Politics of the Budgetary Process.   Boston: Little, Brown.