
Response to the final report of the APSA
Strategic Planning Committee, reprinted for the members of the Public
Policy Section
by Lawrence M. Mead
I have read “Planning Our Future,” SPC’s
appraisal of the problems of the APSA.
I commend the committee on an incisive report. It is thorough and notably well-written.
I offer these responses. Note that I address only certain issues, and
I do so based on limited knowledge of the APSA’s affairs. I have been an APSA member since 1978, but
this is the first time I have seriously read any document of the organization
or made any reaction to it. I am a
member of the Public Policy Section and, currently, a member of its council.
My main response is that the problems of
the APSA run deeper than suggested in the report. The organization’s priorities are askew. I infer APSA’s values chiefly from the
people it honors and names as officers, the sort of research it publishes in
its journals, especially the APSR,
and the institutional concerns that emerge from PS.
On that basis, I would say that the APSA
is interested mainly in political science as an institution, not in the bulk of
its members or in what they do on a daily basis. This gives the organization two tendencies:
·
Scientism: The APSA seeks to advance the discipline’s
claims to be a rigorous and scientific enterprise on the model of economics or
the natural sciences.
·
Populism: The APSA seeks to expand the number of
political scientists and the availability of the Ph.D., especially to
underrepresented groups such as minorities and women.
By promoting these values,
the organization promotes the worldly influence of itself and the
discipline. Both tendencies are deeply
imbedded in American culture, perhaps too deeply to challenge. But, pushed to the current extremes, these
values have created serious internal problems.
They’ve seriously damaged political science as an intellectual endeavor
and a community of scholars.
The
membership problem
The falloff in membership
appears due mainly to scientism. Many
members are repelled by the research published in the APSR. It is no longer
accessible or meaningful to them. More
generally, APSA no longer represents them.
It appears that most of the leading figures in the organization and the APSR believe that:
·
Method is more important than substance.
The mark of leading research is that it rests on a methodology that one
can specify and defend precisely, and which is more sophisticated than methods
of the past. Most published articles in
the APSR are either game theory or
pure political theory, because mathematics and the linguistic analysis of texts
are the only methodologies of which one can give an exact account. They can be reduced to rules. The substantive importance or interest of
the findings is secondary.
·
The goal of research is discovery.
Research should aim to uncover facts about politics or government
previously unknown, on the model of natural scientists seeking new
discoveries. So the empirical articles in
the APSR often address obscure
subjects. That is why the findings are
new. Again, the importance or interest
of the results is secondary.
I disagree with these premises, and I
suspect that most political scientists do.
I think substance is more important than method. It is a greater contribution to knowledge to
construct a compelling argument about an important question in politics than it
is to achieve complete methodological coherence. Indeed, few questions worth studying can be researched in an
entirely coherent way. Methodologies
that are entirely defensible generally lack enough empirical content to be
realistic.
The current orthodoxy suggests that
research can be reduced to a system, requiring only technical
intelligence. Actually, creative
research hinges mostly on asking a good question at the outset and then coming
up with an original hypothesis. Those
are arts that can never be reduced to rules.
It’s the verification of hypotheses that can be systematized to some
extent,[1]
but the intellectual content must be there in advance. Thus, the most memorable research has
intuitive elements of which one can never give an exact account.
I also think that few political
scientists discover things in the manner of the natural sciences. Because the subject matter of politics is
largely open to untutored inquiry, at least outside closed societies, political
scientists rarely uncover facts that are truly new. Our evidence is mostly researchable with only journalistic
methods. We must compete with
journalists and the man or woman in the street. Lay people are always entitled to opinions about politics, as
they are not about atomic physics. We
can be more precise than they, we can update old findings, and we can teach
enduring realities to students. But the
notion, as recently claimed in PS,[2]
that we can teach unknown truths about politics to government professionals is
presumptuous. There is never going to
be National Institute of Politics in the way there is a National Institute of
Health.
Much of the real work of political
science is interpretative. It is to
appraise the implications of facts that anyone can see, or could see if they
took the time to gather them. What do
the facts imply for the success of government or policy? Many of the best-known older works in
political science have this interpretive character.[3] Today, their authors would be much less
known. The presentation and
interpretation of well-known facts is also what most of us do in the classroom,
even at the best colleges and universities.
PS appears to be popular because it expresses
a more catholic view of what the profession does. Also, the Washington staff operation of the APSA I’ve found to be
admirable— always responsive and effective.
I think the APSA’s web page and the materials on it are fine. I’d say the organization is responding well
to the internet, contrary to the report.
But all this is not enough to offset the
exclusionary message given by the leadership and honorees of the APSA, and
especially by the APSR. Until these institutions change to give a
different message, I doubt the membership problem can be solved. All the outreach and salesmanship in the
world will accomplish little. Why join
an organization that apparently excludes you as unimportant and doesn’t value
what you do?
The organization can continue on its
present course only if it is prepared to say that the best technical
researchers, and the departments they dominate, are political science—and write off the rest of the
profession. I think there are some in
the APSA leadership and in the leading departments who would like to do
this. That way, I think, lies
scholasticism and irrelevance, not to mention financial disaster for the APSA.
Scientism also drives the
over-specialization of the discipline.
If good research is defined in terms of method and discovery, then one
must concentrate on smaller and smaller slices of the political world to have
any hope of discovering or saying anything “original.” After a while, all one’s interlocutors are
other super-specialists of the same kind, and one has less interest in
participating in—perhaps even in joining—the APSA. By promoting overly-technical research, the organization has
helped to destroy its own foundation.
There no longer is a single discipline that one can call political
science.
I know from talking to editors—even at
academic presses—how distressed they are at the trends. They foresee little audience for the
hyper-technical research that is now in vogue.
They worry not only about the economics of publishing such work but its
long-term value. A gulf now separates
“cutting-edge” research and anything that could be understood or valued even by
well-educated lay people, let alone undergraduates.
The APSR
The problems of our main journal also
spring from scientism. The APSR appears to be edited with a view to
disciplinary ambition rather than findings of substantive interest or
importance. The contribution of most of
the articles is methodological. Most
enhance or discuss the pretensions of the discipline in some way. Few show any findings that alter one’s view
of politics or government. This is
aside from the problems of accessibility posed by mathematical methods. The political theory articles are the most accessible,
but they too seldom relate to the real world.
The book reviews are far and away the most useful part of the
journal. They have more empirical
content than most of the articles; they derive it second-hand from the books
under review.
The
exclusion of policy: The
report speaks of “selectivity bias.”
That is, the APSR may publish
little in certain areas because it seems to be uninterested in them, so few
scholars in these fields submit, in a vicious cycle. I can vouch for that. As
a public policy specialist, I’ve published four books (three of them
prominently reviewed, including in the popular press) and about 25 academic
articles, including papers in all the leading public policy journals. Some of these publications are semi-popular,
others aimed at technical and expert audiences.
But I’ve never even submitted a paper to
the APSR. The journal publishes very little touching on public policy, and
what it does publish shows little awareness of actual government or public
programs.[4] If I were to submit to the journal I would
expect, not only to be rejected, but to be told to go back to graduate school
and learn game theory.
The problem here is broader than the APSR.
I recently wrote quite an ambitious statistical analysis of the
determinants of successful welfare reform in Wisconsin. A leading political science journal declined
the paper, saying this subject no longer fell within political science. An excellent policy journal then accepted it
with no changes at all.[5]
Perhaps my version of public policy is
itself a super-specialty that mainstream political science justifiably
ignores. Hardly. I write about poverty, welfare, and other
social policy problems, issues with an outsize influence on politics in America
and in other developed countries. I’ve
gone overseas several times to speak at international conferences on these
questions. I have a sizable audience
outside academe. Some other policy
specialists can say the same. But all
this counts for little to the APSA or its outlets.
PS recently published a symposium claiming
political science should be credited with more influence on policy than members
of Congress think.[6] But the editor included no contributors who
actually had had much to do with policy.
A few political scientists actually have influenced policy.[7] A larger group studies how to improve the
operations of government. Presumably,
these researchers have some claim to attention from the scholarly community.[8] But the contributors to the policy symposium
were all behavioral modelers. After
this, you would have to twist my arm to submit to either APSR or PS.
Among political scientists, I’m probably
the best-known expert on poverty and welfare reform. My work is prominently cited in scholarship on these subjects and
on social policy generally. But I’ve
been asked to review for the APSR
perhaps twice in twenty years. What
work it prints on welfare is published without me. I’ve reviewed more books for the journal than I have manuscripts.[9] Meanwhile, I review copiously for all the
policy journals, the National Academy of Sciences, foundations, and publishers.
Rational
choice: To restore the
popularity of the APSR, the most
essential step is to break the grip that rational choice has on the
journal. The editors are overly
impressed with the mathematical sophistication of these methods. This is what suggests that they are
interested in disciplinary climbing more than understanding. I think the point of research is to fathom
the real world, not to demonstrate that political scientists are smart. Rational choice has actually contributed
little to our grasp of politics. The
school also displays intellectual arrogance and intolerance for other methods.[10]
Above all else, that arrogance must be
disowned. The president of the APSA and
the editor of the journal should both state in print that rational choice has
no lock on the discipline, and mean it.
That method should become one among many in political science, not the
only one with pretensions to scientific status. Concretely, APSR should
no longer publish rational choice articles that are purely formal, without
empirical verification. That is
mathematics, not science. Political
science is about the real world.
Broadening
the APSR: The report
suggests that the APSR consider
publishing “high-quality peer-reviewed essays” that would “integrate cutting
edge research for a broad readership.”
Mark Schneider announced at the Policy Section meeting at this year’s
conference that the APSA council had voted either to open the APSR to such work or to establish a
second journal that would emphasize such work by 2003. This second journal might be modeled on the
successful Journal of Economic Literature
in economics.
This would be an improvement. Schneider, the new head of the Public Policy
Section, thought that the new outlet offered particular opportunities to policy
scholars like me. I would welcome
that. But this step is
insufficient. Integrative essays are
not themselves research. They would
just package the existing overly-technical literature for the uniniti-ated, a
condescending enterprise. The real need
is to broaden what counts as research within the APSR itself. One could also
establish a second journal for research using less technical methods. But it would have to stand on the same level
as the existing journal.
I pass over the threat of the internet to
the journals, about which the report says much. This seems to me quite secondary to the problems of breadth and
audience. I see little problem putting
the existing journals, or new ones, on line provided they remain well-edited
and can be downloaded in the same format as now.
The annual meeting
The problems with the annual conference
stem from the populist animus of the APSA—its urge to generalize graduate
political science to many more people than is realistic. Too many people are trying to be political
scientists, with the encouragement of the profession. They aren’t all up to it, and there can never be enough academic
jobs for all of them.
Access: The report mentions complaints that the
conference denies sufficient “access” for scholars. Indeed, I heard that, in the policy section this past year, a
mere 19 percent of proposals were accepted.
Personally, I haven’t suffered here.
Since 1982, I’ve given seven papers and organized four panels at APSA
conferences, besides other appearances.
I’ve been able to get a proposal of some kind accepted virtually every
year I wanted to go.
I have the impression that the conference
is unselective. At least, quality is low. Judging by what I see in the panel paper
room, the vast majority of papers contain little of interest. Most address very narrow subjects, many
contain few findings, and some are quite badly written. This appears to be partly because most of
the authors are inexperienced—graduate students or junior faculty. The meatiest papers are usually from senior
scholars whose names I recognize. That
is not an accident.
Most of the panels on the official
program also strike me as narrow and uninteresting. Other people apparently agree.
The audiences at most panels are remarkably small, often smaller in
number than the panelists. On most
panels, too, the participants present badly—in excessive length and detail, and
without force. Discussants dawdle over
minutia rather than addressing major issues crisply. Again, the usual reason is inexperience. If one is interested in the subject, it’s a
far better use of one’s time just to read the papers.
The situation has worsened noticeably
since I began going to APSA conferences twenty years ago. Today, during panel time, it’s the book
exhibits and the bars that are crowded, not the meeting rooms. The only sessions that draw meaningful
audiences and generate any serious discussion are roundtables. That is because their subjects are broader,
the participants are usually more senior, and the giving and critiquing of
papers is eliminated.
Careerism: To expand access would only exacerbate
these problems. I think the problem
with the conference isn’t low acceptance rates. It’s careerism. What
drives applications to the conference isn’t the desire to give a paper and
engage in serious colloquy with one’s peers.
It’s the drive to get a line on one’s résumé, hence to have a better
shot at a job interview or tenure.
Secondarily, both graduate students and faculty often cannot get their
schools to pay for their travel to the conference unless they are on the
program.
That’s why so many of the papers are
low-quality. The motivation is all to
get accepted, not to produce a decent paper afterwards. For the same reason, some of the panel discussions
strike me as semi-serious. Even as a
full professor, I feel some of the same incentives. I put much more care
into a paper I submit for publication than one I write for the APSA.
The report says that a quarter of the
current presenters are graduate students.
I think they cause most of the problem.
They’ve become entangled in an arms race where they have to get a paper
accepted to have any chance for a job.
But they usually don’t know enough or have enough experience to write or
present well. What is in their interest
individually is not in the collective interest. After they’ve finished their degrees and led a few classes (or
meetings outside academe), they’ll be much better conferencers than they are
now.
Shrinking
the program: I would
recommend, not a larger conference program, but a smaller one. Have fewer panels on broader, more
mainstream subjects, more like the evening plenary sessions than the current
daytime panels. Members would still
propose their own papers and panels to the program committee, but each section
would have fewer slots than now. The
sections would assemble their own panels as now, but the subjects would be
critiqued by the full committee for interest and importance before the
acceptances went out.
I’d exclude non-Ph.D.s entirely from
panels.[11] They might co-author papers with more senior
people, but they could not present.
Their exclusion would permit shrinking the program and raising quality
and audiences without making the competition for the remaining members any
worse than it is now. Restraining the
conference might also restrain over-specialization. Secondarily, the APSA should go on record against the policy of
paying travel to the conference only for people on the program.
As evidence that a smaller program can
work, I offer the conferences of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and
Management. APPAM is the principal
organization of public policy specialists from academia as well as government. I am a longtime member and, currently, a
member of the APPAM council. I’ve also
sat on the conference committee three times.
At APPAM conferences, the program is much smaller than at the APSA. This is partly because the organization is
smaller, but also because there is more insistence on quality and
audience. Presenters tend to be senior
people who know how to summarize an argument in less than 50 minutes, in part
because many have government experience.
Graduate students typically do not present. Presenters are also tightly policed by panel chairs, preserving
time for discussion. So the dialogue
and interest at these sessions is vastly
superior to what typically occurs at the APSA, even though the subject matter
is often rather technical (e.g., program evaluations).
A small program works because careerism
is restrained. There isn’t much
academic hiring in policy, so APPAM hasn’t been on the job track, and the
conference is less affected by credential-hunting. Junior people accept that they are there mainly to listen and
meet people, not to give papers.
Indeed, the program is so selective that many senior people don’t get
chosen. Traditionally, senior people
accepted that because they know chance is involved, and they’ll get in next
year. They have other chances to
participate because the discussion is so good.
But recently, I admit, pressures have risen to allow more panels. It’s coming, I am told, less from grad
students than frustrated faculty. That
will degrade the conference. APPAM may
go the way of the APSA. It’s an arms
race that should be nipped in the bud.
Working
sessions: I don’t think
poster sessions are a meaningful substitute for panels. They produce yet further fragmentation and,
if possible, even smaller audiences.
Rather, I’d organize working meetings of paper writers on common
subjects. The members of each pool
would send a paper on that subject to all the other members, say by a month
before the conference. Each would read
the other papers, on the understanding that his or her paper was also read by the
others.
The groups would meet at the conference
and exchange comments. At these
meetings, a senior person recruited by the program committee would
preside. There would be no
presentations at all. It would be
assumed that everyone had read the papers.
Rather, the time would be divided among the authors present. Each would have the floor for that time and
receive comments from all the other participants, including the chair. Ambitious chairs might organize a dinner for
their group.
For these sessions, all applicants who
were at least in graduate programs would be accepted. There would be no competition and no academic credit gained. But one could get serious feedback on one’s
work and a chance to meet other people with common interests, including the
chair. I’ve advised a number of graduate
students, all from outside NYU, who met me at the APSA or other conferences and
expressed interest in my research.
These working sessions would formalize this sort of interchange. Of course, senior scholars would have to be
willing to act as mentors.
The job market
The report makes brief mention of the
employment problem in political science.
Tenure-track jobs in academia are falling in number. The output of new Ph.D.s from the graduate
schools continues to outpace openings.
More should be made of this.
Here, too, populist goals have been taken to extremes. The problem isn’t just that more political
scientists have to work outside the university, where they are less likely to
join the APSA. It’s also that intense
job competition comes to dominate the association and the profession.
The
narrowing of graduate school:
The scarcity of academic jobs creates harsh pressure for graduate students to
publish very early, if they are to have any hope of making the short list for a
junior academic position, let alone getting appointed, let alone getting
tenure. That in turn has made graduate
programs narrower. Students now
primarily study econometrics or game theory.
Substantively, they specialize much more than formerly, preparing only
one field for comprehensives, versus four when I was in grad school. All of this is aimed at early
publishing. This weakens people as
teachers and as scholars.
Thirty years ago, graduate training was
less technical, but broader and deeper.
One studied little methodology but much history and theory. One specialized in political science, but
not much within the discipline. Because
one prepared multiple fields and methods, one learned what it meant to
construct an argument in some general sense.
You were expected to put your own methodology together to do your
dissertation. The ability to build an
argument up from basic premises and language, after all, was what made you a
philosopher. The need to find your own
way meant that you might take awhile finishing your degree and publishing. But what you did publish was likely to be
original. And you built up a store of
knowledge, interests, and questions to form a research agenda for the future.
Today, there is much less intellectual
investment like this. Students
seriously learn only one analytic method and, often, one data base. This allows them to finish their degrees and
publish quicker, but they also know much less about their specialty and related
subjects. They have less range and
flexibility. Since they know only one
thing, they simply have to keep doing it, and hope it will land them a job and
tenure. Rather than develop their own
method, they apply the one they are taught.
Rather than find their own question, they derive one from the work of
their advisors. They don’t know how to
form their own questions for research later.
In short, they are technicians, not philosophers. It makes for very narrow, scholastic
research, of little interest outside the sub-specialty involved. And it contributes to the hyper-fragmentation
of the discipline. [12]
Meanwhile, the over-extension of graduate
studies had debased the coinage of the Ph.D.
Most of today’s grad students lack the mental range, language abilities,
and background knowledge traditionally associated with that degree. That is one reason why graduate education
has had to become narrower and more literal.
Students require the structure; few can build it themselves. On the other hand, this style of training
also produces scholars without knowledge and literacy. It’s chicken and egg.
Loss
of collegiality: The
sheer number of political scientists also promotes the scientistic canons of
research that now dominate. For if
intellectual standards have declined in a profession, some members will be very
much better than others. The most able
strive to distinguish themselves from the rest. An eclectic approach to methodology makes it too judgmental who
is the best. With quantitative methods,
one can at least say more clearly who is the smartest, and the pecking order is
clearer. But our ability to understand
and interpret the real world suffers.
Of course, competition within a
profession is nothing new. If the
profession were more limited and selective, however, the main point of struggle
would be getting into it. After that,
the members would face less struggle to find meaningful employment, and they
could adopt a more relaxed, more collegial attitude to each other. Rather than one-up each other, they could
associate more as equals. They could
debate method and meaning, rather than use method to define an inner circle and
exclude the bulk of the profession. The
whole atmosphere would be more intellectual, more collegial, and less
scholastic.
To moderate these trends, the association
should actively promote a better balance between the supply and demand of
Ph.D.s. The number of useful positions
might expand if the discipline looked more seriously outside academe.
Expanding
opportunity in government:
I think the chances for political scientists in and around government are
considerable, and under-exploited. As
one of the few political scientists who went first into government, and then
came back to the university, I know this first-hand. When I went to Washington after graduate school, I had little
difficulty in applying my studies to the policy problems I encountered. I had to learn more quantitative methods,
but the analytic and writing skills I had learned in graduate school carried
over very directly.
Political scientists are too pessimistic
about their ability to make it in government.
The usual view is that lawyers have an inside track for political and
staff jobs, while economists dominate research and policy analytic
positions. The truth is that you don’t
have to go to law school to learn enough law to function in government; a smart
person can pick it up on the job. You
do have to go to school to learn the analytic skills that economists have. But today, political scientists often learn
some of the same skills, and they typically know much more about how government functions.
It isn’t commonly perceived, but lawyers
and economists have suffered serious reverses in Washington in the last twenty
years. Attorneys have been eclipsed in
many staff jobs by people with academic training. Washington is becoming more elitist, and the ability to call
yourself “Doctor” counts. More
important, economists have proved unable to deal persuasively with many policy
problems. They do well, not
surprisingly, with problems where the market can be presumed to operate and behavior
is economizing. Behavior can then be
changed by altering payoffs. This
situation prevails in much of economic and regulatory policy. So in these areas economism reigns, and it
should.
But in areas where there is no clear
market, or behavior seems irrational, economists function poorly. That is the case in much of social
policy. Schemes to overcome social
problems with incentive schemes have showed slim results in welfare,
employment, housing, health care, and so on.
That has driven economists out of leading positions in the poverty
debate, to be replaced by sociologists, who have a more complex view of
behavior, and political scientists (myself, Charles Murray, Richard Nathan,
James Q. Wilson, etc.).
Above all, political scientists are much
more comfortable dealing with politics and government. When issues are strongly politicized, they
deal better with the moral and value issues.
Economists once thought budgeting had a rational solution, but recent
budget battles in Washington are contests of ideology. Political scientists also know infinitely
more about administration and intergovernmental relations, which are critical
factors in implementing programs. And
it’s exactly political forces and administrative reforms that are driving
change across much of domestic policy—in welfare, health, education, housing,
the “reinvention of government,” and so on.
Political scientists are equipped to understand these changes as no one
else can.[13]
In view of these trends, the hubris of
the 1960s that economics could comprise a universal policy science has been
abandoned. The policy schools, set up
largely by economists with such fanfare in the 1970s, have given up the idea
that all students have to learn to solve public problems is some statistics and
applied economics. Policy curricula now
include more political analysis and “public management,” which is not far from
old-fashioned public administration.
Today, more than ever, policy is institutions. Policy must be built by harnessing public
passions for change and building and rebuilding government itself. Those who can say even a little about how to
do that will inherit the government policy and analytic jobs of the
future. Policy science could be
returning to its original home in political science, which truly is the master
science.
Required
changes: Most of the political scientists who have
done well in government were atypical of their craft, and most are toward the
middle or end of their careers. To
recruit their successors, and increase their numbers, political science will
have to change.
First, political scientists must give up
their reluctance to make policy arguments about best policy. Traditionally, they thought that to do this
was somehow antidemocratic. Economists
lack the same inhibition, and that partly explains their influence on policy.[14] Second, departments must recruit more and
better students to enter graduate studies in the American field, the natural
home of most students seeking policy careers.
American is now a small field in most graduate programs. That largely means attracting more
Americans, as against foreign students, into graduate studies.
Third, and most important, graduate
training in political science must include more training in policy analysis and
actual government—as against the modeling of government—than it does now. That is, it must become more like the
training that Masters students get in the policy schools. It should include quantitative methods, but
also a lot of more general learning about government, programs, and
issues. Too much focus on the technical
should be avoided, because it is really more general reasoning skills and
writing ability that allow one to make one’s way in staff jobs in the
government. Many analysts in Washington
can run a regression equation; few can write an incisive memo.
Public
policy research: At the
doctoral level, this focus on policy analysis coupled with institutional
knowledge must be raised to a theoretical level and made a basis for
research. This the policy schools typically
do not do; their doctoral programs are small and economistic, in part because
their faculties are still dominated by economists. How to do it is one of the frontiers for political science. Currently, most political scientists who
study policy focus on modeling the policy process, on how policy is actually
made.[15] That focus is not really distinct to the
policy field. There is also not enough
policy analysis in it to prepare students for governmental careers, where they
will have to make arguments about issues.
Research on what policy should
be is largely abandoned to the economists.
I think policy research within political
science ought to join policy analysis with political analysis. One first develops a position about how to
solve an important public problem on the merits, and then goes on to investigate the actual politics of the issue. Policy analysis provides a standard against
which actual policymaking is judged.
Typically there will be a gap between the norm and the reality. Government does not actually “do the right
thing.” What are the political or
institutional reasons for that? The
final question is how the desired outcome and the policy process might be reconciled,
for how that is done is at the heart of statecraft.
This combined approach takes breadth, but
it has the virtue that it brings together research on policy itself with
research on the politics of policy, which today are virtually separate. It models policy research on the reasonings that
policymakers themselves do as they strive to reconcile their desires with what
politics and government can deliver.
Such writing, if one can pull it off, will be visible and influential,
and it will yield insights about government distinctive to the policy field.[16]
Debunking
the “applied”: A final
intellectual change is that political scientists must give up thinking of work
in government as “applied,” therefore of less value than the theoretical
research that goes on in the academy.
It is true that some political scientists who go into government become
so absorbed in administration that they lose all academic perspective on what
they are doing. But it is equally true
that hands-on contact with government generates more new ideas for research
than reading other people’s research in the academy is ever likely to do.
Almost all the questions I’ve pursued in
my work on welfare reform go back to anomalies I noticed while working for
government or while doing fieldwork on welfare employment programs when I was
at the Urban Institute. Research on
poverty, chiefly by economics, traced low work levels by the poor to economic
forces such as welfare disincentives or the job market. But in my interviews, staff suggested rather
that it was a problem of public authority.
Mainly, welfare recipients would work if they were expected to by
welfare itself, and not otherwise. That
located the impediment to work within government rather than the society. This perception led to the arguments that I
and others made for enforcing work,
and from this a revolution in social policy eventually followed.
My point is that this was a contribution
to knowledge, not only to policy. We
usually think that the way to solve social problems is to expand
opportunity. If, instead, it is to
obligate people in new ways, our whole idea of how government relates to
society must change. The implications
reach to the meaning of democracy and citizenship and other issues in political
theory. (A colleague and I are
currently framing a panel proposal for the next APSA conference on this theme.)
I’m convinced that other findings as
important as this remain to be discovered—provided researchers have enough
contact with government for serendipity to occur.[17] I know several former academics now working
in government who have comparable things to say based on their experience. Of course, they must somehow break the time
free to carry out a systematic inquiry and write up their results. That means moving to a think tank, getting a
foundation grant, or—as I did—returning to academe. But in principle, there need be no conflict between government
service and continuing to function as a political scientist.
Even at a philosophic level, there can be
no clear division between policy and scientific argument. Today, all the social sciences pretend to
scientism or positivism, but in fact all have resources that allow them to
address questions of the social good.
Political science, because of political theory, is especially rich.[18] Even the constructs that social science uses
to understand the world tend to embody social ideals, against which reality can
be appraised. That is true of the
conception of the free market in economics, the Madisonian political arena in
political analysis, and so on.[19] Thus, political scientists should see either
academia or government as arenas in which to practice the master science.
Narrowing
the supply: That said, I
doubt that expanding job opportunities in government can entirely balance
demand for new political science Ph.D.s with the supply. So the APSA should also seek to downsize
graduate programs to something more like the output that the job market can
absorb. I’m not sure how to do
this. A collective action problem is
involved. It’s in the interest of every
program to keep churning out degree holders, but not in the interest of the
profession as a whole. Somehow, the
available jobs have to be rationed around graduate departments at the point of
admission to the Ph.D. and not later.
Conclusion
The APSA has allowed the profession to
appear exclusive to its members, while at the same time it has grown too
large. The canons of research are too
narrow, while entry into the discipline, including the conference, is too
broad. I think pretty much all the
organization’s problems follow from these trends. We need rather a profession that is more collegial within itself,
but also smaller and more exclusive in how it relates to the outside
world.
Perhaps the trends are too deep-seated to
contest. Scientism is such a dominant
value in Western culture that, perhaps, it is bound to take over all
disciplines that pretend to make statements about reality. Populism is so canonical that perhaps all
intellectual distinctions, including the Ph.D., are bound to be democratized
and degraded. That amounts to saying
that a true intellectual life is difficult to defend in American culture. Other values are always more important. What America cares about most deeply isn’t
the life of the mind. It’s subjecting
the outside world to science and promoting social equality. So Weber and Tocqueville said.[20]
But the trends must be resisted to
preserve any meaningful profession of political science. Rather than drive the trends onward, the
APSA should at least lean against the wind.
We must become less worldly.
Lawrence M. Mead is a
Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics, New York University.
[1] Gary King, Robert D. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
[2] Arthur Lupia, ed., “The Public Value of Political Research,” PS 33, no. 1 (March 2000): 2-64.
[3] E.g., E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), or Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1979).
[4] E.g., Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, “Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 2 (June 1993): 334-47.
[5] Lawrence M. Mead, "The Decline of Welfare in Wisconsin," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 9, no. 4 (October 1999): 597-622.
[6] Lupia, ed., “Public Value of Political Research.”
[7] For example, John DiIulio (criminal justice), Theodore Lowi (regulation), myself (welfare reform), Richard Nathan (welfare and federalism), Allen Schick (budgeting), and James Q. Wilson (criminal justice). On my own role in welfare reform, see R. Kent Weaver, Ending Welfare As We Know It (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000). chap. 5.
[8] H. George Frederickson, "The Repositioning of American Public Administration,” PS 32, no. 4 (December 1999): 701-11.
[9] I recently wrote a dissent to Joe Soss, “Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action,” American Political Science Review 93, no. 2 (June 1999): 363-80, and sent it to Ada Finifter, editor of the APSR. She invited me to write a rejoinder for possible publication in the journal, but I haven’t had time to do it. She expressed distress and surprise that I had not reviewed for APSR during her editorship, but one reason was few submissions in public policy.
[10] Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
[11] Exceptions would be made for non-academics who may be relevant to some panels (e.g., politicians, pollsters, journalists).
[12] I am swayed here, I admit, by the memory of my own graduate training at Harvard. My teachers were scholars of little self-conscious methodology but impressive learning—Sam Beer, Sam Huntington, Henry Kissinger, Judith Shklar, Michael Walzer, and others.
[13] As one example, the best research anyone is doing on the implementation of welfare reform nationwide is being done by Dick Nathan and his team at the Rockefeller Institute at SUNY—Tom Gais, Irene Lurie (a converted economist), and others.
[14] Richard R. Nelson, The Moon and the Ghetto (New York: Norton, 1977).
[15] Paul A. Sabatier, ed., Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999).
[16] For a fuller discussion, see Lawrence M. Mead, “Public Policy: Vision, Potential, Limits,” Policy Currents 5, February 1995: 1-4.
[17] I may seem to be exalting discovery here as a criterion for research, having disparaged it earlier. But in policy as in most of political research, the evidence to be found can usually be appreciated with journalistic methods, and the main challenge is to say what it means.
[18] Duncan MacRae, Jr., The Social Function of Social Science, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
[19] Lawrence M. Mead, "Science versus Analysis: A False Dichotemy," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 4, no. 3 (Spring 1985): 419-22.
[20] I am struck by how faithfully the APSA expresses the trends that Samuel H. Beer taught were fundamental to modernity—rationalism and voluntarism (by which he meant both democracy and the assertion of individual rights).
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