Presumptive State Child Support Guidelines:

A Decade of Experience

 

 

Maureen A. Pirog

Professor and Chair, Public Policy Analysis Faculty

Co-Director, IU Institute for Family and Social Responsibility

School of Public and Environmental Affairs 241

Bloomington, IN  47405

(812) 856-5926

(812) 855-4605 FAX

 

Tara Grieshop

Indiana University, School of Public and Environmental Affairs

 

Brooks Elliot

Indiana University, Department of Economics

 

Abstract

This article examines the financial burden placed on low-income noncustodial parents by state child support guidelines, variability in this burden across states and over time, policy rationales for this variability, and the effects of high or low support orders on state child support collections.   We find tremendous variability in the support orders of low-income obligors across states, suggesting that states are adopting very different strategies for meeting the income needs of low-income children and obligors.  Also, child support orders are quite regressive, although this regressivity has abated somewhat over the past decade.  There is some evidence, albeit mixed, that states with low child support orders for low-income families have generous welfare programs, using cash assistance from TANF and child support as substitutes for one another in sustaining poor children.  The data also support the notion that states with high support orders for low-income parents collect a smaller percentage of the amount ordered. The data was gathered from a series of mail surveys from 1988-1999 of the State Courts and Child Support Enforcement Agencies of the 50 states and the District of Columbia.      

Introduction

            Since the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988, each state has been required to develop and use income-based child support guidelines.  The evolution in setting child support orders from loose judicial discretion to the mandatory adoption of a predetermined set of objective and numeric formulas largely was motivated by three observations.  Many researchers maintained that existing child support obligations were of inadequate size to meet the needs of children, created both horizontal and vertical inequities, and hence, resulted in inefficiencies in the child support enforcement system (Garfinkel, 1992; Pearson, Thonnes, and Tjaden, 1989; White & Stone, 1976; Williams, 1987; Yee, 1979).  However, state changes have primarily addressed horizontal inequities.  That is, the guidelines established insured that equals were treated equally – noncustodial parents in similar economic situations within the same state should pay similar amounts of child support (Garfinkel, 1992; Garfinkel, Meyer, and McLanahan, 1998; Morgan, 1996, 1998; Pirog-Good, 1993; Sorensen, 1999; Williams, 1994).

            Recently, increasing attention has been given to the treatment of low-income noncustodial fathers under welfare reform.[1]  The persistent pattern of meager compliance with, or complete nonpayment of, child support obligations by low-income obligors has prompted observers to reconsider enforcement strategies.  Focus, in part, has turned to the effects of presumptive child support guidelines on poor, nonresident fathers (Meyer 1998; Primus & Castro, 1999; Roberts 1999a; Sorensen, 1999).  In particular, researchers are examining the extent to which state guidelines require low-income obligors to provide unreasonable proportions of their incomes as child support and the effects of these vertical inequities on their ability to pay (see Garfinkel, Meyer, et al., 1998 for a brief review of this literature).

A 1998 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) examined the collection of child support for families leaving welfare due to the expiration of time limits.[2]  The study found that the majority of families leaving welfare due to time limits would not receive substantial amounts of child support.  For example, 29-41% of families with support orders received no support during the 12 months prior to the termination of assistance; 46-59% reported receiving some of the support owed.  Only 2-13% reported receiving the full amount due over the same time period.  These are rather discouraging figures in light of the increasingly aggressive collection efforts made by state and local child support enforcement (CSE) agencies across the country.  However, the continued resolve of policy makers and CSE officials is manifest in the passage of the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998.[3]    

                Some researchers, though, rather than urge the imposition of harsher penalties for failure to meet obligations, suggest that more realistic child support orders be established for low-income noncustodial fathers up-front (Garfinkel, Meyer, et al., 1998; Primus & Castro, 1999; Roberts, 1999a; Sorensen, 1999).  Suggestions to lower child support orders for poor fathers will likely face strong opposition – reductions in child support awards imply less income for poor children.  On the other hand, if lower child support orders affect greater compliance by these fathers, it is possible that reliable and proportionate streams of income through child support can occur.

In this article, we analyze variability in the amounts and regressivity of child support orders across states over time based on data from a series of biannual mail surveys.  Next, we explore one rationale for the variability in states’ treatment of low-income obligors:  the notion that states use cash assistance from welfare and child support income as two alternative ways to support poor children.  It is possible that some states have more generous welfare benefits to offset losses to custodial families resulting from lower child support orders and vice versa (Primus and Castro 1999).  Finally, we assess the extent to which the amount of child support ordered is related to child support compliance.               

Background

            Welfare and child support legislation enacted during the past decade has placed increasing emphasis on family self-sufficiency and parental obligations.  Welfare reform under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) eliminated the entitlement status for receiving cash assistance and imposed time limits on the receipt of welfare, while often making eligibility contingent on education/training and work requirements.  Welfare laws require single, custodial parents to enter the workforce.  The laws also created an expectation for nonresident parents to remain involved in their children’s lives, at least in terms of the provision of financial support.  The push for reduced reliance on public assistance and increased reliance on private means has rendered the child support system a crucial component to the children of low-income families.  This awareness certainly has contributed to the aggressive enforcement of child support legislation by state child support enforcement agencies.

            Many researchers, however, question this policy approach. Some studies suggest that unless considerable improvements are made in the formal child support system, this approach will exacerbate the poverty experienced by poor custodial families.  Simulation studies have long indicated that even in an ideal environment (that is, the setting of child support obligations for all eligible resident parents and full compliance with both hypothetical and existing orders) child support awards are too low to appreciably increase welfare exit rates or the labor supply of women (Beller & Graham, 1993; Garfinkel, Robins, Wong, & Meyer, 1990; Hu, 1999; Meyer, 1993; Robins, 1986).[4]  As a result, these authors prescribed policy initiatives establishing higher child support award amounts.  In light of historically low compliance rates among fathers of children receiving cash assistance, one wonders whether this is realistic or beneficial.                  

A national portrait of noncustodial fathers and their ability to pay child support has been painted in a series of articles (see Mincy and Sorensen, 1998; Sorensen, 1999, 1997; Sorensen and Halpern, 1998). Using two surveys, the 1987-1988 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) and the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Sorensen, et al. created the well-accepted profile of low-income obligors.  While nonresident fathers as a whole were found to be able to pay more in child support (an estimated $34 billion under Wisconsin child support guidelines), 13-26% of noncustodial fathers were poor or had extremely low incomes.  In 1990, 23% of fathers had incomes below the gross income standard for food stamp eligibility and did not pay any support.  These fathers were young, half had not completed high school, and most were black.  While 90% were employed or actively seeking employment at some point in 1990, only 18% had full-time, year-round employment. 

Recently, Garfinkel, McLanahan, and Hanson (1998) used NSFH data to show that a “large minority” of nonresident fathers has very low incomes.[5]  They found that nearly all of the fathers of children on welfare have incomes below $20,000, while 50% have incomes below $6,000 (in 1995 dollars).  Moreover, noncustodial fathers have fewer assets than custodial fathers and are less likely to own a car or a home (see Pirog-Good and Amerson, 1997, for similar results using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth from 1979 to 1993).  These results strongly suggest that even when willing, low-income obligors possess limited ability to meet their child support obligations.

Complicating matters, Sorensen (1997) found that resident mothers in the NSFH and SIPP surveys are considerably worse off economically as compared to noncustodial fathers.  These single mothers had poverty rates that were two to three times higher.  And, while national surveys are not matched samples and are unable to prove conclusively that low-income nonresident fathers and poor resident mothers are necessarily partners, many believe that this is the case (Beller and Graham, 1993; Garfinkel, McLanahan, et al., 1998; Sorensen, 1999).  Policymakers find themselves in a very difficult position. 

Poor single-parent families desperately need child support income to augment their own earnings and public assistance, while low-income obligors seem unable to meet their existing obligations, let alone withstand higher award amounts. Yet for child support to effect welfare exit rates and the supply of labor by women, higher award amounts are crucial.  Some researchers believe that efforts to cull greater child support amounts from these fathers actually could be counterproductive (Garfinkel, Meyer, et al., 1998; Primus & Castro, 1999; Roberts, 1999a; Sorensen, 1999).  At best, it seems such efforts might simply shift poverty from one group to another.  At worst, poor, nonresident fathers may find their obligations impossible to meet, stop paying child support altogether, and possibly enter the underground economy.  Indeed, anecdotal evidence shows that for some fathers, their relatively high child support orders along with low child support pass-through amounts have this effect (Edin, 1995; Edin & Lein, 1997; Furstenberg, Sherwood, & Sullivan, 1992).

Several policy changes have been prescribed or undertaken to varying degrees by some states to address the lack of compliance with child support awards by poor nonresident fathers.  The provision of employment-related services to low-income noncustodial fathers likely would have the greatest long-term effects.  The TANF program allows states to use welfare block grant funds and maintenance-of-effort money to assist in providing education and training, obtaining transportation, etc. for nonresident fathers of children receiving cash assistance.  Increasingly, revisions of the child support pass-through program have been suggested (Garfinkel, Meyer, et al., 1998; Primus & Castro, 1999; Sorensen, 1999).  PRWORA allowed each state to determine the amount of child support passed through to custodial TANF families without a dollar-for-dollar reduction in their welfare grants.  At the time, most states passed-through the first fifty dollars of child support paid each month and disregarded this income in the calculation of their welfare benefits.  As of January 1, 1999, some thirty states had decided to discontinue the program completely.  In 1998, Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI) offered legislation requiring states to pass through all support collected; it was not enacted.  Researchers also have proposed revisions of arrearage policies – the amounts established and the stringency of related penalties.

Methods and Data

In 1988, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) computed child support orders for every state and the District of Columbia using each state’s child support guideline.  The calculations were based on a scenario describing a family and its circumstances at four different income levels (Munsterman, 1990).  In 1988, the four income levels represented the 25th, 50th, and 75th income percentiles as well as a high-income level for a family of four (Cases A-D).  The four scenarios and levels are as follows:

Mother and father are divorced.  Father lives alone.  Mother and the party’s two children, ages 7 and 13, live together.  Father pays union dues of $30 per month and the health insurance for the two children at $25 per month.  Mother incurs monthly employment-related childcare costs of $150.  There are no extenuating factors to be added or considered for this unit.  The gross combined monthly income for this family is as follows:   

 

Case A:  Combined $1200       -   Father $720       Mother $480

Case B:  Combined $2500       -   Father $1500     Mother $1000

Case C:  Combined $4400       -   Father $2640     Mother $1760

Case D:  Combined $10500     -   Father $6300     Mother $4200

Finally, the father files taxes as a single person with one deduction, while the mother files taxes as the head of a household with three deductions.  The father spends less than 10% of this time with his children.  Union dues are a mandatory condition of employment.

The results of the NCSC calculations were sent to the director of each state’s CSE program and the administrative director of each state court for verification or modification.  At least one agency responded to the 1988 survey.  When both agencies responded and discrepancies occurred, efforts were made to reconcile the differences.  However, when the agencies used different methods to compute the child support orders and both methods were consistent with the state’s guidelines, the NCSC reported the higher figure.

            The scenarios and process used by the NCSC to determine the size of child support orders were replicated in 1991 by Pirog-Good (1993); in 1993 by Pirog-Good and Mullins (1995); in 1995 and 1997 by Pirog-Good and Brown (1996) and Pirog, Klotz, and Byers (1998); and in 1999 by the current authors.  All of the bi-annual survey data are used in this article.  The same scenario and income levels have been used for each survey.  While the income levels certainly do not represent the income percentiles originally set in 1988, we believe maintaining these amounts provides a way to determine the extent to which child support orders have changed over time solely because of the evolution of state guidelines.  This process abstracts from changes in nominal income levels due to changes in inflation or real factors. 

            Garfinkel, Meyer, et al. (1998) noted that order levels had increased since the implementation of guidelines but were unable to determine whether the increase resulted from the existence of guidelines or from an increase in men’s incomes during the same time period.  We feel this process goes a way towards addressing the question of whether guidelines cause an increase in the levels of child support orders.  Moreover, Williams (1994) notes that studies of child support based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) suggest that the average constant-dollar value of orders had increased by 1987 when many states had implemented guidelines.  He warns, however, that his results are only suggestive, as this value might be biased upwards by the inclusion of updated awards.  Again, this problem is avoided here.  The simple scenario developed by the NCSC does not include updated awards, second families, post-secondary educational expenses, or other extraordinary factors that tend to be treated differently by states.  All changes in child support orders can be directly attributed to state guidelines.    

The 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 calculations were computed as of January 1st.  In each of these years, responses were received from both the state CSE office and the state court regarding child support levels.  Many of the responses by state agencies differed from each other.  For the surveys from 1991-1999, correspondence was undertaken with each state to determine the actual amount of the orders as specified by the state’s guidelines.  The vast majority of the discrepancies were resolved and stemmed from the miscalculation of taxes, computing orders for one rather than two children, and other relatively simple errors.  Pirog-Good and Brown (1996) found that such errors are common and tend to be related to the complexity of the guidelines, the training of personnel using the guidelines, and the availability of computer software to assist with the calculations.   However, following the lead of the NCSC, whenever differences arose from the use of different procedures that were both consistent with the state guidelines, the higher figure was reported.  Data on CSE awards for 1988-1999 by state are presented in Appendix A.

Results

            Summary statistics regarding the amount of child support obligations between 1988 and 1999 for Cases A-D are provided in Table 1.  Average child support obligations have dropped over the years for Cases A and D.  On the other hand, fathers in the two middle-income scenarios, Cases B and C, are paying more on average than they paid in previous years, though the average order for Case B dropped slightly between 1997 and 1999.  Cross-state variability in Case A orders is large and has increased consistently from 1988 to 1999.  The standard deviation represents 54 percent of the average child support order for case A, compared to 18 percent for the more consistent orders for fathers in Cases B-D.  As has been the trend for several years, courts use discretion in setting orders at the income extremes, particularly in high-income cases.  In those states, individual judges determine the level of child support that they deem appropriate for the situation.  Hence, the award amounts for families in similar economic situations may differ substantially. 


Table 1:

Summary Statistics:  Monthly State Child Support Orders, 1988-1999.

 

Year

 

Mean

 

Standard Deviation

 

Coefficient of Variation

 

Median

 

 Court Discretion

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case A

1999

 

176.65

 

95.35

 

0.54

 

187.00

 

CAa

 

1997

 

179.12

 

91.36

 

0.51

 

180.00

 

VT

 

1995

 

193.32

 

88.78

 

0.46

 

201.50

 

VT

 

1993

 

202.49

 

80.36

 

0.40

 

197.00

 

CT, DC, MA, VT

 

1991

 

202.71

 

80.56

 

0.40

 

204.50

 

CT, DC, WV

 

1988

 

202.84

 

78.06

 

0.38

 

191.00

 

MA, PA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case B

1999

 

416.71

 

68.45

 

0.16

 

433.00

 

None

 

1997

 

424.04

 

94.66

 

0.22

 

433.00

 

None

 

1995

 

417.47

 

62.25

 

0.15

 

431.00

 

None

 

1993

 

393.82

 

65.75

 

0.17

 

411.00

 

DC

 

1991

 

401.43

 

56.39

 

0.14

 

411.00

 

None

 

1988

 

389.64

 

61.04

 

0.16

 

391.00

 

PA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case C

1999

 

632.81

 

84.66

 

0.13

 

634.00

 

None

 

1997

 

620.71

 

92.63

 

0.15

 

626.00

 

None

 

1995

 

627.37

 

122.08

 

0.19

 

616.00

 

None

 

1993

 

607.98

 

87.91

 

0.14

 

618.00

 

DC

 

1991

 

616.10

 

84.51

 

0.14

 

617.00

 

FL

 

1988

 

616.46

 

125.05

 

0.20

 

613.00

 

PA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case D

1999

 

1167.10

 

206.41

 

0.18

 

1094.00

 

AL, MD, MA, OK, UTb

 

1997

 

1170.40

 

222.71

 

0.19

 

1066.00

 

AL, MA, PA, UT

 

1995

 

1151.67

 

211.21

 

0.18

 

1091.00

 

DE, ID, MD, MA, NJ, NY, UT, WA

 

1993

 

1126.35

 

236.59

 

0.21

 

1090.00

 

CT, DC, ID, KS, KY, MD, MA, MO, NC, OH, SC, TX, UT, WA

 

1991

 

1134.38

 

218.89

 

0.19

 

1079.50

 

AZ, AR, CO, CT, DE, DC, FL, ID, IA, KS, KY, LA, MD, MA, MO, NV, NJ, NY, OH, RI, SC, SD, TX, UT, VA

 

1988

 

1222.71

 

389.20

 

0.32

 

1108.00

 

AZ, FL, ID, IN, MD, MA, NE, NJ, OH, PA, SC, UT, VA

aCalifornia is court-determined within the range $124-$208.  We use the average, $166.

bUtah is court-determined, but the minimum is $903.

            Summary statistics regarding state legislated child support orders relative to income for 1988-1999 are found in Table 2.  In this table, the mean is the percentage of the father’s gross income that would be needed to pay the state mandated child support award.  First, we assess the impact of child support payments on the income of the noncustodial fathers under each scenario, and then we examine the regressivity of support orders for 1999.

 

Table 2:

Summary Statistics:  Child Support Orders as a Proportion of Noncustodial Fathers’ Income, 1988-1999.

 

 

Year

 

Mean

 

Standard Deviation

 

Coefficient of Variation

 

Median

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case A

1999

 

0.245

 

0.132

 

0.540

 

0.260

 

1997

 

0.249

 

0.127

 

0.510

 

0.250

 

1995

 

0.269

 

0.123

 

0.459

 

0.280

 

1993

 

0.281

 

0.112

 

0.397

 

0.274

 

1991

 

0.282

 

0.112

 

0.397

 

0.284

 

1988

 

0.282

 

0.108

 

0.385

 

0.265

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case B

1999

 

0.280

 

0.046

 

0.163

 

0.289

 

1997

 

0.283

 

0.063

 

0.223

 

0.289

 

1995

 

0.278

 

0.042

 

0.149

 

0.287

 

1993

 

0.263

 

0.044

 

0.167

 

0.274

 

1991

 

0.268

 

0.038

 

0.140

 

0.274

 

1988

 

0.260

 

0.041

 

0.157

 

0.261

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case C

1999

 

0.240

 

0.032

 

0.134

 

0.240

 

1997

 

0.235

 

0.035

 

0.149

 

0.237

 

1995

 

0.238

 

0.046

 

0.195

 

0.233

 

1993

 

0.230

 

0.033

 

0.145

 

0.234

 

1991

 

0.233

 

0.032

 

0.137

 

0.234

 

1988

 

0.234

 

0.047

 

0.203

 

0.232

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case D

1999

 

0.185

 

0.033

 

0.177

 

0.174

 

1997

 

0.186

 

0.035

 

0.190

 

0.169

 

1995

 

0.183

 

0.034

 

0.183

 

0.173

 

1993

 

0.179

 

0.038

 

0.210

 

0.173

 

1991

 

0.180

 

0.035

 

0.193

 

0.171

 

1988

 

0.194

 

0.062

 

0.318

 

0.176

 

Child Support Orders as a Percentage of Obligor Income

Case A represents the lowest income scenario.  In this situation, the nonresident father earns $720 per month (annual income of $8,640).  This exceeds the 1999 poverty guideline by a mere $420 per year and is $2,000 less than full-time minimum-wage pay.  The custodial mother has monthly income of $480.  Our data indicate that in 1999, a noncustodial father earning $720 per month was required to provide, on average, 24.5% of his income as child support.  The median amount was 26%.  In this case, the mean evidently is biased downward by two orders of $0 – Connecticut and Oklahoma.  The largest order in 1999 was an award of $302 by South Dakota, which represents 41.9% of the father’s income.  The mean proportion of 24.5% is slightly less than the highest over time of 28.2% in both 1988 and 1991.  Over these eleven years, average Case A child support orders dropped 13.1% (3.7%-points) or by $26.19 each month ($314.28 annually).  The median proportion dropped slightly (but not linearly) from 26.5% in 1988 to 26% in 1999.  It is unlikely that the reductions in mean and median proportions of income required for child support payments significantly affect the financial circumstances of nonresident fathers or lead to salutary compliance effects. 

                  Case B is a modest income scenario with the custodial parent earning $1,000 per month and the noncustodial parent earning $1,500 monthly (annual income of $18,000).  In the absence of child support income, the custodial mother’s annual income of $12,000 is less than the $13,880 poverty guideline for a family of three and would possibly qualify this family for food stamps.  However, given asset limitations, we treat the custodial family as though it would not qualify for TANF.  According to 1999 calculations, a noncustodial father would provide 28% of his income as child support, on average.  The corresponding median figure is 28.9%.  In 1999, Pennsylvania set the highest award of $585 (39% of the father’s income) and Mississippi set the lowest order of $240 (16% of the father’s income).  The mean proportion of 28% in 1999 is slightly less than the highest of 28.3% in 1997.  However, it is 2%-points larger than the smallest of 26% in 1988.  This increase has been steady over the eleven years, save the aforementioned differences between 1997 and 1999.  In sum, the data indicate that a nonresident father with annual income of  $18,000 has been required to pay an increasing proportion of his earnings as child support over the past eleven years.

            Case C is a middle-income scenario in which the custodial and noncustodial parents have monthly incomes of $1,760 and $2,640, respectively (annual incomes of $21,120 and $31,680, respectively).  In 1999, a noncustodial father would be required to pay 24%, on average, of his earnings to child support.  The corresponding median amount is also 24%.  For Case C, the District of Columbia established the highest award amount of $821 (31.1% of income) for 1999.  The lowest award was set by Oklahoma – $415.40, which is 15.7% of the nonresident father’s income.  Over the last decade, the average child support order relative to the noncustodial father’s earnings has been rising slightly, but steadily, for this case.  The highest average over the decade was the 24% of 1999.  The lowest is 23% in 1993, with an initial average of 23.4% in 1988.  Again, one finds a pattern of a slight but gradual increase in median child support orders.  Hence, the same conclusions can be reached as those drawn from Case B.

            Unlike Cases B and C, the highest income scenario in this study, Case D, seems to suggest a small reduction in the proportion of income a father provides for child support from 1988-1999.  In this case, the custodial parent earns $4,200 per month while the noncustodial parent has a monthly income of $6,300 (annual incomes of $50,400 and $75,600, respectively).  On average, in 1999, this father would be required to pay 18.5% of his income to meet support orders.  For this year, the largest proportion required was 28.5% from a monthly child support order of $1,796 set by Kansas, while the lowest was 13.7% from Idaho’s obligation of $863.  In 1988, the mean proportion was 19.4%.  This represents a reduction of 4.6% (0.9 percentage points) from 1988 to 1999. 

Regressivity Analysis

            Now we consider changes in the regressivity of child support obligations over time.  Beginning with the calculations for year 1999, the average child support orders as a percentage of gross income across Cases A-D, respectively, are as follows:  24.5%, 28%, 24%, and 18.5%.  The corresponding median figures are:  26%, 28.9%, 24%, and 17.4%.  Both sets of calculations indicate that for 1999, child support obligations are indeed regressive.  That is, lower income noncustodial fathers (Cases A and B) are required to pay larger portions of their earnings than their higher-income counterparts.  Cases A-D, respectively, for 1988 provide these series:  28.2%, 26%, 23.4%, and 19.4% for average proportions; 26.5%, 26.1%, 23.2%, and 17.6% for median proportions.  Again, regressivity is evidenced.  Over the decade, Cases A and B have borne the greatest burden with Case A’s proportions decreasing and Case B’s increasing over time as discussed above.

            Researchers have put forth several explanations for the regressivity of state child support guidelines (Primus & Castro, 1999; Roberts, 1999a; Sorensen, 1999).  First, child support orders must be adequately set in order to meet the needs of children.  Child support guidelines are established to address this.  While income can be quite variable, the basic needs of children do not necessarily vary as much as income.  Also, child support awards are designed to reflect the earnings capacity of the noncustodial parent.  Some states have adopted policies that allow courts to assume that the nonresident parent can work a full-time minimum-wage job.  Support orders are then based on this level of income.  Third, as previously mentioned, many states impose mandatory minimum child support award amounts even when the noncustodial parent has little or no income.  Our results suggest that the last two factors have contributed to the regressivity we observe.            

Child Support Orders and Welfare Generosity

            We conducted a series of bivariate analyses between the child support calculations for Case A and various reasonable measures of welfare generosity.  The measures considered for each state are:  (1) maximum monthly TANF benefits (for a family of three), (2) allowable months of TANF before time limits terminate or reduce benefits, (3) child support pass-through amount, (4) months of exemption from work requirements, (5) age of youngest child for work requirement exemption, (6) full-family or partial (adult-only) sanctions.[6]  We wanted to determine if support orders and welfare measures are negatively correlated.  That is, do states make efforts to offset low child support awards with other sources of income or lengthier periods of assistance?  Alternatively, do fiscally conservative states with low welfare benefits try to meet the needs of low-income women and children with high child support orders?

            The basic approach taken here is an extension of the work begun in Pirog, Klotz, and Byers (1998).  In that article, the authors, also continuing previous analyses (Pirog-Good, 1993), asserted that child support for very low-income women and children often is inadequate to replace cash assistance from their AFDC or TANF programs.  However, they claimed states tend to use child support and cash assistance as substitutes for families with very low income.  As evidence, they split the 1997 Case A orders and maximum AFDC benefits at their respective medians.  Those states with AFDC benefits or Case A orders above the medians were classified as high welfare or child support award states.  Those below the medians were classified as low.  They found a statistically significant negative relationship between the two variables.  Low child support order states were often high welfare states, and high child support order states were often low welfare states.  

            Replicating the method of high/low classification for the 1999 data, we found a similar polarization.  Most states had either high welfare benefits and low child support awards or low welfare benefits and high child support awards.  In addition, we correlated Case A orders with our measures of welfare generosity (See Table 3). 

 

Table 3:

Correlations of Case A Orders and Various Measures of Welfare Generosity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Correlation

Significance
Maximum TANF Benefit

-.376***

.003
TANF Time Limit

-.004

.488
Pass-Through

.060

.338
# Months of Work Exemption

.082

.285
Age of Youngest Child for Work Exemption

.082

.283
Full-family or Partial Sanction

-.149

.149

 

Note.  N = 51 for all variables in Table 3; Coding for the sanction variable is as follows:  full sanctions = 0, sometimes full and sometimes partial = 1, and partial sanctions = 2.

Significance levels:  *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

 

            The measure of welfare generosity of most immediate importance to a poor custodial family is the maximum monthly TANF benefit.  A moderate negative relationship, statistically significant at the 1% level (Pearson correlation, -.376; p = 0.003), exists between Case A and TANF benefits.  Correlations between Case A and the other measures are small and not statistically significant.  These results are not surprising, considering that no relationship originally existed between monthly welfare benefits and child support orders when state guidelines were first legislated in 1988.  Over the past decade, however, the two variables have become increasingly correlated (Pirog, Klotz, and Byers, 1998; Pirog-Good and Mullins, 1995).  The other measures of welfare generosity may demonstrate a similar pattern of increasing correlation in future years.  TANF regulations only went into effect in 1997, and state policies have been phased in since that time.  As states modify these policies and conduct mandatory reviews of their guidelines over the coming years, stronger relationships may appear between the measures of TANF generosity and state-mandated child support orders.

Child Support Orders and Compliance Effects

            As discussed earlier, it is asserted that a lessening of the regressivity of support obligations would contribute to a reversal of the historical, persistent pattern of low or no payment of child support by poor nonresident fathers.  Since our concern is the meeting of obligations by poor noncustodial fathers, who likely are fathers of children receiving TANF, we used the following measures of compliance from FY 1999:  (1) per capita distributed collections for current assistance and former assistance cases, (2) per capita distributed collections for current assistance and former assistance cases as a percentage of the Case A child support order, (3) number of families removed from AFDC/TANF with child support collections during 1998, (4) percent of current support owed that was distributed for current assistance and former assistance cases, and (5) cost effectiveness.[7]  As in the prior section, we performed a series of bivariate analyses between child support orders for 1999 and these measures of compliance (See Table 4). 

 

Table 4:

Correlations of Case A Orders and Various Measures of Child Support Compliance.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Correlation

Significance

N
Per Capita Distributed Collections for Current/Former Assistance Cases

-.153

.154

46
Per Capita Distributed Collections for Current/Former Assistance Cases as a Percentage of Case A Order 

-.417***

.002

46
Number of Families Removed from AFDC-TANF/FC with Child Support Collections in 1998

.154

.141

51
% of Current Support Due That Was Distributed for Current and Former Assistance Cases

-.214*

.070

49

Cost Effectiveness

.236**

.048

51
 

 Significance levels:  *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

 

            The first measures of compliance we used capture the amount of child support that is actually distributed per current or former assistance case.  Both per capita distributed collections and the per capita distributed collections as a percentage of the Case A order resulted in a negative relationship, though only the measure of collections as a percentage of the Case A order was significant.  This indicates that noncustodial fathers are more likely to comply with child support orders in states with lower state-mandated orders.  It is not surprising that only collections as a percentage of the Case A order was significant, since this measure considers the amount the state requests in relation to the amount it distributes.  We would expect distributed collections per capita to be higher for high-award states, though that does not mean that they have greater compliance.

            The next variable we checked was the number of families removed from TANF/AFDC with child support in 1998.  The results showed a small positive correlation but were not significant.  This suggests that the amount of the award ordered has little effect on removing the custodial family from welfare.  Since we would expect higher-award states to remove more families, the lack of a relationship may indicate low compliance for high-award states.  Further, the lack of a negative relationship also reflects the fact that the low-award states have orders too low to affect the custodial families’ TANF/AFDC receipt.

            To determine the percentage of child support orders that states actually distribute, we created a measure of child support distributed as a percentage of child support due.  The results show a negative and modestly significant relationship (Pearson correlation, -.214; p = .07).  This indicates that the higher-award states distribute a smaller percentage of what they hope to collect than low-award states. 

            Finally, we looked at cost effectiveness and found a significant, positive relationship between the measure and Case A awards.  These results show that high-award states are more cost-effective than low-award states.  This probably occurs because it takes fewer non-custodial parents who comply to cover the costs of child support enforcement.  While these results are positive in terms of using government funds efficiently, it ignores the impact of high awards on children and on noncustodial fathers.  In terms of children, high award states can be cost-effective relative to low-award states even when a large percentage of the children receive none of the child support ordered.

Discussion

            This article examines changes in child support orders over time.  Specifically, it assesses the impact of state-mandated guidelines on noncustodial fathers, assessing the regressivity of the guidelines.  Focusing on low-income fathers for the latter part of the analysis, the article also addresses the relationships between child support orders for the low-income scenario and measures of welfare generosity and child support compliance.

            Continuing an earlier trend, child support orders for the scenarios at the income extremes have dropped slightly.  The average order also dropped for Case B between 1997 and 1999, though fathers under that scenario are paying higher levels of child support than in 1988.  Meanwhile, the average order for Case C increased considerably to the highest amount since tracking orders.  Case A orders are highly variable across states, highlighting the different ways states balance the needs of the children with noncustodial fathers’ ability to pay. 

            The results of the analysis of welfare generosity suggest that most states have not yet addressed the effect of time limits on TANF receipt on their practice of substituting TANF benefits and child support orders.  Now that many welfare recipients have hit state time limits, it will be interesting to see if states respond with changes in state guidelines.

Our analysis of child support compliance measures, though not definitive, indicates that states with lower awards experience greater compliance from noncustodial fathers.  Further lowering orders for that group of fathers, while decreasing possible collections, may increase the amount of money actually received. 

Finally, the disparate treatment of noncustodial parents across states is indicative of horizontal inequities that exist at all income levels but are most pronounced for low-income parents.  That is, a low-income noncustodial parent with the same number of children of the same ages, same personal and ex-spousal incomes, identical child care and income-related expenses is required to pay no child support in Connecticut and 41.9 percent of gross income in South Dakota.  For the highest income obligors, the difference between the highest and lowest monthly child support order is $933 per month.  Even casual inspection reveals that such differences cannot be explained by cost of living variation across states.  South Dakota is hardly a high cost of living venue in comparison to Alaska, New York and Hawaii, three states with considerably lower than average Case A orders. 

In light of these persistent, and in some cases growing, horizontal inequities, we recommend that the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement undertake a serious review of a national child support standard.  Many states do not have the research staff to undertake individual studies and yet are faced with legal challenges to their guidelines every time they modify or update their individual standards.  A federal standard that would provide some flexibility for regional differences in the costs of raising children would provide some administrative relief for states and greater equity for custodial parents, noncustodial parents, and children. 


References

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Appendix A:  Child Support Orders by State

                                               

Case A:  Father's Income=$720 monthly

State

1988

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

Alabama

257.00

259.00

260.00

280.00

280.00

280.00

Alaska

127.00

135.00

137.00

25.00

38.00

38.00

Arizona

310.00

298.00

284.00

281.00

75.00

247.00

Arkansas

160.00

165.00

150.00

150.00

150.00

177.00

California1

145.00

241.00

261.00

281.00

278.00

166.00

Colorado

268.00

266.00

260.00

260.00

261.00

261.00

Connecticut

286.00

CD

CD

0.00

0.00

0.00

Delaware2

219.00

100.00

100.00

91.00

91.00

117.00

DC

224.00

208.00

CD

208.00

208.00

208.00

Florida

280.00

285.00

262.00

306.00

261.00

265.01

Georgia

180.00

184.00

184.00

184.00

210.00

184.00

Hawaii

50.00

60.00

60.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

Idaho

173.00

CD

245.00

226.00

166.00

256.00

Illinois

132.00

137.00

136.00

136.00

136.00

10.00

Indiana

325.00

327.00

327.00

292.00

327.00

265.00

Iowa

99.00

176.00

187.00

183.00

189.00

187.00

Kansas

265.00

252.00

225.00

228.00

227.00

270.50

Kentucky

178.00

293.00

293.00

293.00

293.00

290.00

Louisiana

191.00

290.00

265.00

292.00

292.00

292.00

Maine

318.00

294.00

286.00

283.00

290.00

290.11

Maryland

300.00

295.00

295.00

295.00

295.00

295.00

Massachusetts

CD

50.00

CD

137.00

137.00

136.41

Michigan

253.00

210.00

162.00

124.00

141.00

141.18

Minnesota

91.00

97.00

170.00

111.00

84.00

73.00

Mississippi

180.00

133.00

138.00

140.00

124.00

115.20

Missouri3

306.00

293.00

293.00

265.00

265.00

219.00

Montana

273.00

50.00

15.00

40.00

15.00

16.00

Nebraska

175.00

176.00

54.00

50.00

50.00

50.00

Nevada4

180.00

180.00

180.00

180.00

180.00

200.00

New Hampshire

191.00

156.00

140.00

227.00

50.00

50.00

New Jersey

191.00

251.00

259.00

260.00

267.00

260.00

New Mexico

287.00

288.00

283.00

288.00

291.00

290.00

New York

27.00

25.00

25.00

25.00

50.00

25.00

North Carolina

180.00

264.00

272.00

287.00

57.00

50.00

North Dakota

95.00

126.00

126.00

90.00

126.00

126.00

Ohio

259.00

262.00

266.00

258.00

278.00

252.72

Oklahoma5

283.00

258.00

258.00

250.00

171.00

0.00

Oregon

245.00

176.00

165.00

149.00

159.00

230.00

Pennsylvania

CD

201.00

254.00

257.00

257.00

137.00

Rhode Island

281.00

269.00

315.00

315.00

315.00

253.00

South Carolina

258.00

252.00

256.00

202.00

183.00

259.40

South Dakota

108.00

200.00

128.00

286.00

275.00

302.00

Tennessee

189.00

192.00

197.00

199.00

200.00

200.00

Texas

140.00

143.00

147.00

145.00

147.00

148.64

Utah

206.00

253.00

153.00

131.00

131.00

131.00

Vermont

118.00

50.00

CD

CD

CD

50.00

Virginia

299.00

299.00

289.00

289.00

289.00

289.00

Washington

273.00

282.00

287.00

50.00

50.00

281.60

West Virginia

50.00

CD

155.00

136.00

117.00

112.00

Wisconsin

180.00

180.00

180.00

180.00

180.00

180.00

Wyoming

134.00

149.00

133.00

201.00

200.00

232.14

1 Case A is court determined, within the range of $124-$208.  We used the average, $166.

2 Delaware's guideline assigns single, one deduction tax status to both parents for purposes of the support calculation.  No credit is given for visitation that is less than 50%.  When a parent is unemployed or under-employed, minimum income of $1052 is attributed.  The minimum child support order for two children is $117.

3 Missouri law applies a credit for time that the father spends with the children.

4 Nevada law allows courts to make subjective case-by-case deviations for 9 factors, such as day care costs and disparity of income.

5 Case A is imputed to minimum wage.

 

Case B:  Father's Income=$1,500 monthly

State

1988

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

Alabama

412.00

415.00

417.00

433.00

433.00

433.00

Alaska

280.00

298.00

300.00

301.00

312.00

313.00

Arizona

460.00

450.00

453.00

453.00

782.00

481.93

Arkansas

303.00

315.00

305.00

305.00

305.00

372.00

California

301.00

395.00

467.00

485.00

478.00

407.00

Colorado

414.00

417.00

409.00

409.00

409.00

409.00

Connecticut

511.00

523.00

516.00

429.00

404.00

435.00

Delaware1

375.00

396.00

397.00

466.00

467.00

367.00