Presidential Vetoes and Public Policy.

Dick Watson's book is a useful extension of his two previous articles on the presidential veto. The volume will appeal more to scholars of American institutions than to those in public policy because, despite its appearance in the title, policy perspectives apart from a very brief utilization of four content categories in Chapters 2 and 5, are absent from this analysis. Even scholars of Congress and the presidency may be surprised that there is no discussion of divided government in this interesting but not very theoretical treatment of the modern veto from 1933 to 1980.

The Presidential Veto and Public Policy is a well written account of the modern veto incorporating quantatative and qualitative data. For the author latter the cites numerous legal cases, presidential libraries and interview data. Despite using time series regression the quantitative analysis is fairly descriptive. Watson uses only "nationally significant bills" and year as the unit of analysis, but the operationalization of such legislation is murky since it is dependent upon being subject to a Congressional Quarterly, Inc. "key vote." The analysis encompasses as many as fifteen independent variables to explain veto propensity but many of these variables are poorly justified. Nevertheless, he achieves a respectable adjusted R2 of .74 with only three independent variables, with CQ's presidential support score and the president's party margin in Congress as the best predictors of the veto.

The examination of the executive branch influence in the veto decision in Chapter 3 is the most interesting albeit among the most descriptive analysis in the book. This discussion is unique among veto studies and provides a good assessment of the enrolled bill process. However, the author never shows that any changes in the enrolled bill process are a function of party change in White House (p.86). He also gives a lot of credence to Legislative Reference Division recommendations but later admits that the OMB director often differs from it and advises presidents privately. Later Watson shows that the OMB director often does not follow the LRD recommendation. No coding rules of intercoder reliability are reported. Additionally, small N problems occur and the differences reported sometimes are not statistically significant. The author provides a weak discussion of veto messages and never tells us why they are important.

Chapter 5 covers rationales given for the veto but gives no justification for their placement; "unwise policy" constituted 50% of all objections. He then divides this major (unwise) category into six subareas with vague justification for doing so. Watson incorporates pocket vetoes here but does not say why we should expect them to differ from regular vetoes. I am not sure why the author focused on individual presidents but he did a very interesting study of eventual outcomes of significant legislation, finding that presidents usually prevailed. Finally, Watson talks about veto threats, presenting no data, but citing Spitzer on this interesting but elusive variable.

Chapter 6 is on the item veto. Watson discusses its numerous variations and how it played on role early in our history. He shows that Grant was the first president to use it while the only president clearly opposed to the item veto was Taft. Watson fairly reviews the numerous arguments for and against the item veto but recognizes that only a small proportion of federal spending would be subject to it and the "reform" might save no money. He also reviews the legal arguments over whether a statutory item veto would be legal or whether it must require a constitutional amendment. Watson concludes that the proposal to have an item veto is a bad idea but he does favor greater rescission authority for the president. A simple majority vote in either house could reject the rescission and it can be done by statute rather than constitutional amendment.

Like the ends of the chapters themselves, I found the conclusion to this book very thin; virtually no implications are drawn. Watson concludes that the veto remains a potent weapon even though presidents give many reasons for their decisions. However, he makes no general conclusions on presidential power or the significance of the presidential veto itself. He argues that a mere threat can be used to hopefully revise a bill according to presidential preferences. Watson also takes opinions on other issues. For example, he opposes signing statements and takes the position that presidents can pocket veto when Congress adjourns for more than three days.

Despite flaws, Watson's Presidential Vetoes and Public Policy is a useful follow up to Robert Spitzer's work. Although covering the modern veto only, it combines quantitative and qualitative data and attempts to use scientific methods of multivariate analysis to explain veto usage. It provides innovative data on executive branch influence and follow up on vetoed bills. Accordingly, it is must reading for scholars of presidential-congressional relations. This book is the capstone to Dick Watson's distinguished career of studying American government.

Steven A. Shull
University of New Orleans