Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social
Governance. By Paul Hirst. Amerherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1994. 222 p. $45.00 ©, $16.95 (p).
Associationalism's history is that of a socialist alternative
to statist collectivism in the 19th and early 20th century Europe,
finding expression in Friendly Societies for social insurance
and the Cooperative Movement. Paul Hirst recovers associationalism
and decouples it from socialism. The result is an important contribution
to democratic theory and to the way we think about organizing
the economy and social welfare. Associative democracy would renew
society from the bottom up through free association.
Hirst's context is the systemic crisis occasioned by the collapse
of state socialism, the less spectacular but equally profound
failure of market liberal experiments in the Anglo- American world,
and loss of faith in the "pragmatic halfway house" (p.2)
of social democracy. His response is not itself systemic, for
associative democracy is not a blueprint for an alternative system
(though toward the end of the book Hirst does explain how a fully
associative system might work). The idea is to supplement existing
institutions rather than replace them.
Hirst asks us to "imagine a system that combined citizen
choice with public welfare" (p.6). With republicans, Hirst
believes that true freedom can be found only in association, not
in naked individualism. But given the diversity of contemporary
society, associative freedom cannot be achieved in even the best
of republican states. States have failed in too many dimensions.
Thus association must now be partial and voluntary.
Associative democracy would involve regional economic governance
(in, for example, industrial districts) and public/ private partnerships.
Business accountability to workers and communities would counter
current trends toward economic transnationalization. The economic
successes of Japan and European corporatist countries suggests
to Hirst that a cooperative economy is functional (though he opposes
the statist and exclusive aspects of corporatism).
Hirst devotes special attention to the organization of welfare
(encompassing health, education, and social insurance) and how
it might be detached from the welfare state. His criticisms of
the welfare state are familiar. His remedy is original. Individuals
would choose where to get their welfare from an array of self-organized
associations. Each such association would be a partnership of
providers and recipients, funded partly from general taxation,
partly from a guaranteed minimum income to all individuals. Welfare
associations would compete for the custom of clients.
Society cannot live by association alone, and Hirst recognizes
the hazards of unregulated association. To prevent (for example)
the organization of an Aryan Bigots' Education Association, Hirst
proposes a vigorous public sphere that would transcend associations.
His second remedy is more familiar: the state, now interpreted
as "the association of associations". This body would
use liberal constitutionalist principles to determine who should
be denied public funds, and what common standards should be dictated
(for example, a core educational curriculum to promote individuation;
p. 202).
Hirst expects far less of his state than does the other flavor
of associative democracy currently on offer, associated with the
names Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers. Cohen and Rogers want the
state to actively create the right kind of associations; Hirst
notes, rightly, that this is not the kind of state that does,
or perhaps can, exist. Hirst's own state would merely facilitate
association. Yet it turns out that the state still has to do a
great deal of nurturing-for example, by establishing finance mechanisms.
With the power of the purse comes power, and so the centralized
state creeps back in.
Hirst is inattentive to constraints upon associationalist reform
emanating from three environments. The first is the natural environment:
he has little to say about how associational democracies might
confront ecological crises. The second is the international environment-the
threat of war does much to explain why we have centralized states
in the first place. The third is the economic environment: disinvestment
might well punish associationalist experiments.
It would be asking too much to have all these potential difficulties
resolved within the pages of a single book. and doubtless associative
experiments would shed light on these issues. The basic model
has many attractions, and Associative Democracy is an important
contribution to contemporary debates in political economy and
public policy. It deserves to be read widely.
John S. Dryzek
University of Melbourne