Moral Conflicts and the Policy Process

by Raymond Tatalovich, Loyola University Chicago and T. Alexander Smith, Michael P. Bobic, University of Tennessee

Modern public policy analysis can be traced to a seminal article by Lowi (1964) where he categorized policies based on their content. Analysts focus on the "why" and "how" and "to what effect" of public policy (Hancock, 1983)--the dependent variable-but Lowi argued that "policy affects politics" and thus conceived of the type of policy as being an independent variable. The Lowi paradigm was applied cross-culturally by T. Alexander Smith (1969, 1975, 1982), whose thinking was shaped by Christoph's (1962) analysis of the death penalty debate in Britain. Smith (1975: 90) added a category of "emotive symbolic" policies that "generate emotional support for deeply held values...[and] the values sought are essentially noneconomic." To employ Schattschneider's (1960) vocabulary, moral conflict is characterized by wide "socialization" and deep "intensity" in which single-issue groups are the dominant form of organization (Tatalovich and Daynes, 1993).

Examples of this policy type are British racial immigration policy (Studlar, 1980), daylight savings time in New South Wales (Richmond, 1978), abortion in the U.S. (Tatalovich and Daynes, 1981) and Europe (Lovenduski and Outshoorn, 1986), school prayer, gun control, pornography (Tatalovich and Daynes, 1988), animal rights advocacy (Jasper and Nelkin, 1992), homosexuality, and patriotic symbols like flags (or confederate emblems) and Official English laws (Tatalovich, 1995). These public policies target individual behavior at odds with social norms, and Lowi (1988) acknowledges a fundamental difference between the "radical politics" of moral conflict and the "mainstream politics" of economic conflicts.

Those who utilize Lowi's paradigm, like most policy analysts, focus on policies which are the hallmark of the modern welfare state and our system of mixed capitalism. For them, the "why" involves economic transactions, class conflict, and the rational model of self-interested actors. The "why" looms even larger in moral conflicts, for different reasons.

Why: Status Conflict. Max Weber (Miller, 1990) theorized that politics can reflect social status or economic class, and "status uncertainty" or "status preservation" seem to trigger moral conflicts. Sociological literature on "symbolic politics" utilizes status theory to explain why conflict erupts over belief systems-Temperance (Gusfield, 1963), pornography (Zurcher, Kirkpatrick, Cushing, and Bowman, 1971), textbooks (Page and Clelland, 1978), school prayer (Moen, 1984), even the Equal Rights Amendment (Scott, 1985). Unlike the 1950s "mass society" theorists who saw extremism as irrational, these studies suggest that the disaffected can be mobilized to defend values which give meaning to their lives. In studies of mass opinion, economic conditions and self-interest can be less relevant than the intensity of feelings toward a minority group or political symbol (Sears, Hensler, and Speer, 1979).

The classic sociological work (Smelser, 1962: 109) defines a "norm-oriented" movement as "the restoration, protection, modification, or creation of social norms" [through] "a rule, a law, a regulatory agency, designed to control the inadequate, ineffective, or irresponsible behavior of individuals." Such a backlash is triggered by four structural "strains," says Smelser (287-289): (1) new knowledge which can eradicate a condition previously taken for granted, (2) disharmony between normative standards and social conditions, (3) new values that define certain social conditions as evil, and (4) groups experiencing a real or apparent loss of wealth, power, or prestige. Seemingly the first three "strains" would mobilize interests that favor social change and the fourth would provoke counter-organization by defenders of the status quo.

If status preservation lies at the heart of moral conflict, then longitudinal analysis would identify those societal changes that have cumulative effects until some critical threshold is reached, whereupon conflict ensues. There have been periodic Nativist outbursts against immigrants, and evidence indicates that the (mainly Southern) states that most favored immigration restrictions in the 1920s have enacted Official English language laws during the 1980s (Tatalovich, 1995).

How: Process Variables. Issues of moral conflict are not easily assimilated into theories and models based upon economic and class interests. What is needed is an approach that applies to diverse public policies and that also bridges the gap between behavioralism and institutionalism (Agassi, 1975). A possible candidate is the "plan"-the basic unit for traditional social analysis whose antecedents are Weberian "subjectivism" and the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz (Lachmann, 1970).

A public policy "plan" or the everyday "plan" of individuals are conceptually similar. Both are mental schemes in which the ends, the means, and the obstacles are welded into a more or less consistent whole and projected into the future. For both, means and obstacles would include other people, material resources, political institutions, and ideologies. In this regard, a public policy "plan" is simply the generalization of various individual plans. This conceptual approach offers the advantages of linking individual actions to institutional contexts and thus is entirely compatible with the view of public policymaking as a dynamic and future-oriented enterprise.

Future research on moral conflict might also focus on the key "process" variables rather than rely solely on the "content" of policy. To move beyond nation-specific studies toward building a general theory, moreover, requires the use of variables that can be applied comparatively and cross-culturally. And specifically, we should attempt to operationalize the notion of conflict in this policy domain. Scope of conflict can refer to the "social" context (number, variety, and types of interests) and the "institutional" arena (variety of governmental actors shaping the policy outcome).

One effort is underway to code the type of interest groups (representing narrow clientele, sectors of the economy, class interests, and norm-oriented movements) to measure "intensity" and their number as an index to the "scope" of social conflict. On the institutional side, a measure of conflict "intensity" can include how often "unorthodox" parliamentary tactics (filibusters to prevent action or "guillotines" to prevent debate) are used relative to "normal" legislative procedures, while the "scope" of institutional conflict may be gauged by the number of government actors involved in shaping the legislative outcome (standing committees, the floor of each chamber, the executive-and the judiciary where applicable).

Regression analysis of cases from Western Europe and the United States using these variables suggests that "it is not so much the nature of policy as the nature of the conflict which leads to specific levels and patterns of institutional activity" (Smith and Bobic, 1993). Since process cannot be separated from the scope and intensity of conflict (Schattschneider, 1960), the notion that "policies determine politics" needs some elaboration (Kellow, 1989). It is the way moral issues are subjectively perceived and defined that determine how they are resolved.

There are ideological and cultural dimensions that may predispose legislators, as in Britain, to vote alike on issues like homosexuality and capital punishment (Read, Marsh, and Richards, 1994). What may be applicable is "cultural theory" as pioneered by anthropologist Mary Douglas and introduced to political science by the late Aaron Wildavsky. It encourages us to understand how cultural patterns affect political preferences and ideology (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 1990) where the "ideologies" are linked to interpersonal relations as shared "ways of life." The MPs who oppose capital punishment and favor gay rights would be characterized as "individualists" and "egalitarians" whereas their opposite number would be labeled "hierarchists."

Comparative research suggests that moral conflicts in the United States often are decided by the Supreme Court, whereas in parliamentary systems they are not so much "legislatively-" as "legislatorally-settled." In Europe, the tendency exists for MPs to refuse the party whip and for government leaders to abdicate or avoid responsibility. An analysis of 63 policy disputes across North America and Europe indicates that emotive-symbolic policymaking is typified by (1) backbencher leadership, (2) party disunity, (3) procedural unorthodoxy, and (4) a failure of leadership by the Government (Smith, 1982). In the United States, where the Supreme Court shares constitutional powers with the other branches, moral conflicts come within the purview of the courts, partly because legislators do not relish taking a stand, may be opposed to their party majority, or expect the courts to support their policy preferences, but mainly because the high court has authority to nationalize a public policy by "incorporating" the Bill of Rights.

Virtually all nations except the United States used parliamentary enactments as the method to codify liberalized abortion (Glendon, 1987). However, adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) gave rise to a 1988 decision by its Supreme Court nullifying the 1969 abortion law (Morton, 1992), and in Germany, whose Constitutional Court can overrule legislation, the abortion dispute also found its way to the Court (Czarnowski, 1994). Elsewhere, where courts are not so powerful, legislators and even governments are sometimes compelled to ignore the time-honored tradition of "collective responsibility" by calling for a national referendum to settle the abortion controversy (Millns and Thompson, 1994; Girvin, 1994).

To What Effect: Compliance. Compliance is implicit in the implementation stage of the policy process, almost taken for granted in cases of economic or social-welfare policymaking, but that is not the case with moral conflicts.

First, since moral conflicts are perceived as zero-sum games by those most involved, settlements are not resolutions, and the opponents may not accept the democratic verdict. Issues that encourage political elites to resort to unorthodox parliamentary tactics will arouse the body politic to violate the rules of the game. Two leading indicators are (1) the time frame over which a moral conflict persists and (2) the frequency of efforts to modify or reverse the initial policy. That legislatures in four states refused to enact Official English laws only encouraged the advocates to win voter approval through referenda (Tatalovich, 1995). We need to resurrect the "feedback loop" to understand that outputs can generate demands, not support. In the absence of consensus-building, demands can undermine the legitimacy of the system and cause the dissenters to invoke a higher authority against the state. Thus, what is unconventional political behavior-direct action and violence-becomes the norm for moral conflicts, as shown by the antics of pro-lifers and animal rights advocates.

Second, because values are the defining core of one's status in society, being a good loser may not be acceptable. A moral conflict involves personal esteem in intangible ways that make class rivalries pale in comparison. Often battles involve more symbolism than substance, and it is here that feelings and emotions override objective self-interest. Though fewer than one percent of the 1.5 million abortions done annually involves rape, the 1989 congressional debate over easing the Hyde Amendment to allow Medicaid payment in rape cases was no less intense than if the vote had been on a constitutional amendment to legalize all abortions. In 1994, proponents of the ban on assault rifles were undeterred by the reality that all but a few of the thousands of murders are committed with handguns, just as those who opposed including the death penalty must know that all executions since 1963 were by state authorities. The terms of the public debate focus more upon symbolic goods, which define values, than upon the actual content of a particular law. The subjectivism of the antagonists defines relatively minor issues as zero-sum games.

This problem is magnified where decision-making is biased towards zero-sum outcomes rather than consensus-building. It is here that observers draw a distinction between legislative enactments and judicial decrees. Schwartz (1981: 65) noted that "[a] striking characteristic of American life is the ease with which moral causes are translated into political issues" and, compared to Canada, she (85) speculated that "[w]hen moral interests are successful in taking their case to the Constitution ...they have the means of incorporating their view of conduct into the core of political values." Rights rhetoric can polarize like political ideology or religious dogma. In Canada but especially the United States, Ted Jelen (1994: 193) claims that since abortion couples religious truths with the rhetoric of rights, "[b]oth of these forces carry the implicit threat of democratic incivility."

Third, moral conflicts involve altruistic commitments to principle (rarely profits) and to others in ways unappreciated by pluralist orthodoxy. Opponents of capital punishment do not face the prospects of being executed; the ACLU does not defend free expression because it panders to pornography; women who champion abortion rights do not necessarily have to cope with unwanted pregnancies. Social scientists are reconsidering altruism as a powerful motivator for political behavior, one grounded not in self-interest but in a shared "perception of themselves as one with all humankind" (Monroe, Barton, Klingemann, 1991: 335).

What is unclear is whether our social structure is more congenial to moral debate, and whether moral conflict is a top-down or bottom-up agitation. Edward Shils (1956) observed that Americans were more receptive to mass movements directed against subversive influences in high places. Noting the absence of "McCarthyism" abroad, he concluded that elitist aspects of British society and the higher deference accorded its public institutions insulated British elites from mass politics. Support for McCarthyism had been linked to status anxieties among the masses though others have argued that political elites exploited those sentiments for partisan gain (Lipset and Raab 1978: 224-235). A longitudinal analysis of drug and alcohol policies indicated to Kenneth Meier (1994) that those issues were not salient to the public, and the political elites promoting Official English laws acted as "trustees," not constituency delegates (Tatalovich, 1995).

In Canada, Morton and Knopff (1992) view issues like gay rights, feminism, and abortion as an elitist agenda to reflect the "post-materialist" age. Here post-materialism may give rise to an ideological divide between the "New Left" and the "New Right" on abortion, women's liberation, gay rights, pornography, and traditional religious (creationism) values (Flanagan 1987: 1306). Whatever the scenario, both would portend more status confrontations between the normative order and social change. Looking ahead, as Lowi (1988: xxi) put it, moral conflicts represent "an agenda for a new policy analysis appropriate to the new politics."

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